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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Pathological memory functioning in alcoholics has been
viewed as both cause and consequence of prolonged abuse.
Specific differences in alcoholics from nonalcoholics in the
processing of emotionally charged stimuli have been implicated in the addictive process.

In a study conducted by this

author and preliminary to the present study, differences
between alcoholic and nonalcoholic subjects in the accuracy
of their memories for the frequency of occurrence of emotionally charged stimuli were demonstrated.

The target stimuli

used in the preliminary study were the subjects' own mood
states as recorded on self-report forms over a two week period.

A memory task was later administered, in which the

subjects estimated the frequency of occurrence of their moods
during the recording period.
When these memory estimates were compared to the
previously recorded rates of mood occurrence it was found
that the estimates from subjects in both groups were highly
accurate.

Some evidence was found for a small decrement in

memory accuracy in the alcoholic group.

However, when

accuracy was examined by the emotional content of the
estimated stimuli, larger group differences emerged.
1
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Although the alcoholics appeared to have more random error in
their estimates, they also demonstrated less systematic error
than the non-alcoholic subjects, whose judgments could pe
called defensive, in that their estimates
moods and minimized negative moods.

maximized positive

The systematic error

demonstrated by the alcoholic subjects was in the same direction as that of the nonalcoholics less extreme.

Since

the preliminary study focused on possible cognitive deficits
in alcoholics and therefore on accuracy, an extensive investigation of the effects of mood relevant content of items on
memory bias was beyond its scope.
The literature on the effects of depression on
cognitive processes, however, suggested a possible
explanation of these results.

That is, the two groups may

have differed in level of depression, resulting in different
degrees of accuracy and bias for various kinds of affective
memories.

When the literature on depression and cognition

was reviewed, several theoretical perspectives on depression
and cognitive performance emerged (such as the learned
helplessness model of depression, the depressive realism
model, and theories of mood selectivity effects) which
predict different degrees and types of bias in affective
memories for depressed and nondepressed persons.

Separate

trait and state depression effects on memory were
hypothesized to mediate these predicted differences.

The

literature on the incidence and etiology of depression in
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alcoholics, and the escape theory of alcohol addiction
suggested that these predictions and hypothesized processes
may be relevant to alcoholics.

The present study combined

these related lines of research and theory in order to make
and test predictions about the relationship between
depression and memory biases.
The present study used archival data to investigate the
role of depressed affect as a variable mediating the
differences found in the preliminary study.

Trait depression

as measured by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI) and state depression as measured by the
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) were used to measure specific
types of depressed mood and mood predispositions.

An adapted

version of the Experience Sampling Form (ESF), an inventory
similar to the Program of Mood States (POMS) was used to
measure positive and negative affect more generally over the
two week reporting period described earlier.
The present study focused on bias rather than accuracy
in memory.

Also, in addition to self-reports and memory

estimates, behavioral measures were developed in an attempt
to understand the amount and kinds of cognitive strategies
used by alcoholics and nonalcoholics in their performance of
memory tasks, and how these differences might be related to
specific types of depression, and to negative affect more
generally.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Alcoholism and Memory for Mood Occurrence
In the literature on cognitive functioning of
alcoholics, there is a growing consensus that

neurological~

damage to some extent accounts for their usually poorer
performance on a wide variety of tasks, including those
involving memory functions (Becker & Kaplan, 1986; Butters &
Cermak, 1980; Goldman, 1983; Parson & Farr, 1981).

There is

evidence that alcoholics may be specifically impaired in
certain types of memory for emotional events (Cowan, 1983;
Ellis, Thomas, McFarland, & Lane, 1985; Johnson, Kim, &
Risse, 1985; Markowitsch, Kessler, & Bast-Kessler, 1984;
Markowitsch, Kessleer, & Dezler, 1986; Warrington, 1986). Yet
access to memory for moods and emotional events may be
essential to the treatment of alcoholism and prevention of
relapse (Freed, 1978; Goldman, 1983; Sussman, Rychtarik,
Mlueser, Glynn, & Prue, 1986) as it is to the development of
changes of self in all individuals (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1977).
One basic memory function which has been meagerly investigated in alcoholic subjects is memory for frequency of
4
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occurrences.

This is the kind of memory required to answer

such questions as: were you sad more often this week, or in
the previous week.

A substantial body of experimental

evidence suggests that adult humans are highly sensitive to
the frequency of occurrence of events (Hasher & Zacks, 1984;
Greene, 1986; Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986). In the verbal
learning paradigm that has most often been used to evaluate
the abilities of persons to accurately estimate frequencies
of presented target items, correlations between actual and
estimated frequencies of occurrence have typically been in
the high .80's (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982).

However,

because of the limited procedures and stimulus materials that
have been investigated, it is difficult to generalize from
existing laboratory studies to naturalistic settings.
An investigation of memory for frequency of occurrences
in which alcoholic subjects were compared to non-alcoholic
subjects was conducted by the present writer (Richards,
1986).

The study focused specifically on-memories for one's

own mood states and experiences, as in the example question
above.

There were two objectives in conducting this study.

The first objective was to determine if the high correlation
between estimated and actual rates of occurrence obtained
under laboratory conditions could be obtained in a more
ecologically relevant setting.

The second objective was to

examine differences in judgment accuracy between alcoholic
and non-alcoholic subjects.

6

Several theories were used to develop hypotheses
about groµp performance on a task of memory for frequency of
occurrences of moods.

Automatic Processing Hypotheses.

predicted high correlations between estimates and recorded
moods for all subjects, regardless of alcoholism status
(Hasher & Zacks, 1984).

Availability Heuristic Hypotheses,

predicted differences in accuracy related to stimulus
content, with subjects overestimating the frequency of
stimuli that are relevant or salient to them (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973).

Availability Heuristic Hypotheses in this

context, assume that the content of salient stimuli is
different for alcoholics and non-alcoholics.

A third set of

hypotheses were generated from the prediction of impaired
performance in alcoholics paralleling the cognitive
impairments found in other types of memory tasks (Goldman,
1983).
Self-reported mood state data was collected for
alcoholic and non-alcoholic subjects over a two week period.
As they conducted their usual daily routines, subjects were
cued by means of long-range pagers to pause and record their
moods.

The record was made on a standard form that included

a ten item self-rating of mood at the time of the cue.

At

the end of two weeks, subjects were asked to estimate their
recorded moods from memory, using another standard form.
Difference scores for each subject on each mood item were
derived by subtracting each frequency from its corresponding
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estimate.

Both signed and absolute values of differences

were used to investigate group performance.
Both groups tended to overestimate positive items and
underestimate negative items.

Estimates correlated with

actual frequencies at .82 across groups, with some subjects
having correlations as high as .99.

Evidence for relative

memory impairment in alcoholic subjects was present but weak.
Stronger evidence was found for differences between groups
related to content of stimuli.

A trend was demonstrated for

nonalcoholic subjects to systematically underestimate
negative moods and systematically overestimate positive moods
more than alcoholic subjects.

For positive mood items this

overestimation difference approached significance.

Although

alcoholic subjects demonstrated overestimation and
underestimation in the same direction as other subjects,
their systematic distortions were not as extreme and
estimates by alcoholics contained more error that was
apparently unsystematic. The nonalcoholic group's accuracy
appeared more sensitive to evaluative content than the
alcoholic group.
These

patterns of error were surprising in that they

appeared inconsistent with Availability Heuristic Theory,
which predicted that group biases in accuracy would depend on
the relevance of item content, with subjects overestimating
items more relevant to their concerns, due to the increase of
salience at encoding and availability at recall of such
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items, resulting from biases in set.

Instead, the groups

were found to be similar in direction of bias, but different
in degree.

It was not apparent that Availability Heuristic

Theory could provide an explanation of these group biases,
except by resorting to the rather untenable argument that
alcoholic subjects had experienced all items as less salient
than nonalcoholic subjects.

Other theoretical approaches

toward cognitive performances were sought to account for the
observed group differences.
Depression as a Possible Mediator of
Differences in Memory Biases
A related area of research suggested a possible
explanation of the results described above.

Effects similar

to the overestimation and underestimation trends found in the
preliminary study have been reported· in the literature on
human learning and depression.

Depressed subjects have

demonstrated the kinds of biased, systematic distortions in
learning predicted from social psychological theories of
judgment biases, while depressed subjects demonstrated such
distortions to a lesser extent.

A kind of depressive realism

was described by Alloy and Abramson (1979).

In their studies

of estimation of contingency of reward on behavior (to be
described in detail later in this review), depressed subjects
were more accurate in their estimates of contingencies of
outcomes than were non-depressed controls, who tended to
overestimate contingencies in the direction that would be
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more desirable or beneficial to themselves.

The researchers

concluded that nondepressed subjects succumb to various
"cognitive illusions" more easily than do depressed subjects,
and that depressed persons may be in a sense "sadder but
wiser".
The results of both Hasher and Zacks (1979) and Alloy
and Abramson (1979) contradict in similar ways predictions of
some cognitive theories of depression.

These theories

emphasize the depressed person's inability to accurately
perceive events and reconstruct reality in a consensual way
(Beck, 1974).

The depressed person is viewed as consistently

distorting the future, ongoing events, and the past in ways
that both place the self in a negative light, and reflect the
anticipation of failure and defeat.
In regard to cognitive performance on hedonically
charged tasks, several studies support the hypothesis that
increased inaccuracy of perception of frequency of
reinforcement may result from depression ( Buchwald, 1977;
Wener & Rehm, 1975).

Other studies have found the picture

far more complicated, and in some ways approaching the
greater accuracy for depressives found by Alloy and Abramson
(1979) in studies of perception of contingency of
reinforcement.

Rather than following contemporary theories

of depression (e.g., Beck, 1976) by displaying a self-blaming
attributional style, depressed subjects ·have often been found
to be less biased in their attributions about causes of
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success or failure, and less biased in their judgments of
contingency of reinforcement than nondepressed subjects
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Abramson & Alloy, 1981; Kuiper,
1978; Raps, Peterson, Reinhard, Abramson, & Seligman, 1982;
Tennen & Hezberger, 1987).

Nelson and Craighead (1977) for

example, found depressed subjects to be more accurate about
frequency of punishment than nondepressed subjects (who
underestimated the amount of both punishment and
non-reinforcement), while simultaneously significantly
underestimating the amount of positive reinforcement.
If such findings about estimates of contingency and
reinforcement frequency can be generalized to estimates of
mood occurrence, it is conceivable that the differential
biases found in the preliminary study were mediated by
different levels of depression in the two groups, while
differences in unsystematic error (caused by

cognitive

deficits in alcoholics) were obscured by the same
depression-related biases.
Some evidence supporting the hypothesis that the
nonalcoholic and alcoholic groups differed in level of
depression was found in the preliminary study data.

Rough

inferences about the level of depression can be made based on
differences in the frequencies of moods recorded by the
subjects in each group.

The two groups were not

significantly different in mean occurrence of combined
positive mood states, with the nonalcoholic group having a
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mean of 53.8% with a standard deviation of 19.4%; whereas the
alcoholic. group had a mean of 58.42% with a standard
deviation of 16.5% •

The two groups were significantly·

different in moods states that were neither positive nor
negative, with the nonalcoholic group having mean of 29.3%
with a standard deviation of 17.1%, whereas the alcoholic
group had a mean of 18.3% with a standard deviation of 13.5%.
The differences in the occurrence of combined negative
moods approached significance, with the nonalcoholic group
mean being 16.8% , with a standard deviation of 8.1%, whereas
the alcoholic group had a mean of 23.3% and a standard
deviation of 13.5%.

When individual negative mood items were

examined, three of ten resulted in significant differences at
the .05 level (i.e., Angry, Confused, and Ashamed) and one
(Tense) resulted in a significant difference at the .01 level
with the alcoholic group having the higher mean for all ten
negative mood states over two weeks.

The alcoholic group

could be described as experiencing more negative affect,
similar levels of positive affect, and less "neutral"
emotional time relative to the nonalcoholic group.

These

differences are similar to those expected between two groups
with different levels of negative affectivity (Watson &
Clark, 1984) a variable known to be highly associated with
depression.
With these differences in mood experiences in mind, a
post hoc attempt was made to determine if they were related
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to the differences in accuracy of memory for moods, as
various theories of depressed affect would predict.

The

emphasis of the preliminary study was on accuracy rather than
systematic bias related to mood content.

Because of this, no

measure of total bias by mood content was used in analyses.
A related measure that captures much of the same information,
the correlation coefficient normalized by the r to z
transformation (Hays, 1973) was used in a subsequent analyses
of the data relevant to the current discussion.

Often

referred to as a discrimination coefficient in the literature
on frequency of occurrences (Flexnor & Bower,1975) the
correlational measure of accuracy is a measure of relative
accuracy.

It answers the question of how strongly related

are the subjects estimates and their target items.

A high

correlation can result from either high absolute accuracy, or
systematic inaccuracy.
The correlation of each subject's estimates with the
corresponding actual rates of occurrence of their moods
across 30 items was calculated.

Based on this measure, the

two groups were virtually identical in relative accuracy: the
nonalcoholic group mean was .83 with a standard deviation of
.15, while the alcoholic group mean was .80 with a standard
deviation of .18.

Group status alone had a nonsignificant

correlation with accuracy of only .03. To investigate the
possibility that evaluative direction might be interacting
with group status and level of frequency of various moods to
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influence accuracy, several correlational analyses were
performed. Since an interaction with group was suspected,
separate analyses by group were conducted initially.

The

correlation of level of positive mood with accuracy was
determined to be nonsignificant in the nonalcoholic sample (r

= .23),
= 05).

but significant in the alcoholic sample (r

= .555,

£

This differential predictability having confirmed an
interaction between group, mood state occurrence and
accuracy, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with
the subjects from both groups combined.

Overall accuracy as

measured by the above described discrimination coefficient
was predicted from each subject's mean frequency of positive
moods, mean frequency of negative moods, and mean frequency
of mood responses in neither the positive or negative
category, with group membership and interaction terms as
additional predicters.

The final stepwise equation accounted

for 57.8% of the variance in accuracy scores, with the rate
of positive mood accounting for the largest percent of
explained variance, the rate of negative mood accounting for
the second highest percent of variance, and several
interactions between mood rates and group status accounting
for other significant proportions of variance in accuracy
scores.
Taken together, these three correlational analyses
supported the hypothesis that the frequency of mood
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experienced over the two week interval was related
differently to accuracy in the alcoholic and nonalcoholic
groups. It appeared that positive mood frequency and negative
mood frequency interacted with group status to moderate
differences in mood accuracy.

The low sample sizes and low

probabilites of Type I error suggested that these
relationships were fairly robust.
Overall, several aspects of the preliminary study
implicated depression as a variable of interest in memory
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics. With this
background, the next three sub-sections will review areas of
psychological literature supporting these implications.
First the literature on the incidence of depression among
alcoholics will be reviewed, to be followed by a review of
the literature on the role of depression, affect, and
affective memories in the etiology of alcoholism.

A

sub-section describing the literature on cognitive
performance in depression will follow, outlining typical
findings and their similarities to and differences from the
findings of the preliminary study.
The Incidence of Depression in Alcoholism
The effects of depressed mood on memory would be
irrelevant to the study of memory in alcoholics if the
incidence of depression in alcoholism was not substantial.
However, the higher incidence of trait depression among
alcoholics when compared to nonalcoholics has been a
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cornerstone of some theoretical and treatment approaches to
alcohol addiction and was therefore viewed as a variable that
might have mediated the differences between alcoholics ·and
nonalcoholics detected in the preliminary study (Jaffe, &
Ciraulo, 1986; Jones, 1968, 1971; Keeler, Taylor & Miller,
1979; Neriano, 1981; Neriano, McCarthy & McCarthy, 1980;
Wikler, 1973; Woodruff, Guze, Clayton, & Carr, 1973).
Determining the incidence of depression among
alcoholics and finding ways for screening for depression
early in the recovery process has been of interest recently,
since some investigators have suggested that among
alcoholics, depressed alcoholics are most in need of
intensive, long-term therapeutic programs (Willenbing, 1986).
Some investigators, however, see no difference in treatment
outcome and course of illness between depressed and
nondepressed alcoholics (Hesselbrock, Hesselbrock, Tennen,
Meyer, & Workman, 1983; Schuckit, 1983).

Substantial

evidence suggests that depressed alcoholics have longer
histories of problem drinking, more previous treatments for
alcohol misuse, more trouble in resisting use of alcohol,
more marital problems, and more physical symptoms related to
alcohol abuse than other alcoholics (McMahon & Davidson,
1986).
A recent study of depressed alcoholics found them to be
more anxious, tense, restless, apprehensive, and having more
somatic symptoms than nondepressed alcoholics (McMahon &
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Davidson, 1986).

There is also evidence that as a group they

are more apt to be interpersonally detached with avoidant or
asocial personality traits, to have disorganized and
distracted cognition, and to have a negativistic self-image
(McMahon & Davidson, 1985).
In their review of the literature on the relationship
between alcoholism and depression, Jaffe and Ciraulo (1986)
noted that the percent of alcoholics considered clinically
depressed depends on the diagnostic criteria and conceptual
frames of the investigator, as well as on the point in the
cycle of alcohol use and withdrawal in which the patients are
assessed.

Depressive symptoms may be very common and very

intense in alcoholics without warranting the diagnosis of a
separate affective illness.

These depressive symptoms may

clear up very quickly after detoxification.

For example, one

study reported as many as 98% of recently admitted patients
reported depressive symptoms which waned after a few days to
several weeks to normal levels (Shaw, Donley, Morgan, &
Robinson, 1975).

This has led some to the view that only a

small percent of alcoholics have persistent severe depression
(Keeler et al, 1979; Schuckit, 1979).
Studies that attempted to examine the occurrence of
more stable kinds of depression than depressive symptoms
after detoxification have produced a wide range of estimates
(Cadoret, Troughton, & Widmer, 1984; Freed, 1978; O'Sullivan,
Daly, Carroll, Clare & Cooney, 1979; Schuckit, 1979, 1983).
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For example, Weissman and Myers (1980) found 44% of community
alcoholics had major depression, 15% had minor depression, 6%
had bipolar depression and 18% were considered to have
depressive personalities.

Midanik (1983) found 33% of female

problem drinkers and 17 % of male problem drinkers to have a
coexistent depression.

When the same study examined persons

who were alcohol dependent, 56.6% of the females and 19% of
males met the criteria for both disorders. Patients may also
be divided into those who develop depression before alcohol
use and those who develop it after chronic abuse, with the
first group being considered primary depressives.

In studies

where primary depression was used as a criterion, estimates
of the proportion of depressed patients ranged between 3% and
46%, with the incidence of primary depression consistently
more frequent among female alcoholics (Beck, Steer, &
McElroy, 1982; Hesselbrock et al., 1983; Schuckit, 1983;
Winokur, Rimmer & Reich, 1971).
In summary, various measures of depressive symptoms
taken at different points in the recovery process have
resulted in widely different estimates of the incidence of
clinical depression and depressive symptoms in alcoholic
subjects.

Depressive symptoms appear to be most extreme upon

admission for treatment, with some gradual decrease over the
treatment period.

Despite this gradual decline in depressed

affect, strong evidence exists that a substantial number of
alcoholics also have long-standing clinical or sub-clinical
depression.

18
The Role of Depressed Affect and Affective
Memories in the Etiology of Alcoholism
The high correlation between depressed affect and·
alcoholism suggests a possible causal connection.

Jaffe and

Ciraulo (1983) listed ten possible causes for the high
incidence of depression among alcoholics: 1) the direct toxic
effects of alcohol on the brain; 2) indirect toxic effects,
via other organs and body systems; 3) effects of alcohol
withdrawal; 4) central nervous system (CNS) effects of drugs
(other than alcohol) related to the treatment or use of
alcohol; 5) CNS effects of injury or anoxia associated with
alcohol-related trauma and/or suicidal gestures; 6) the
effects of social losses related to alcohol use; 7)
psychological responses to physical impairment related to
alcohol use; 8) a personality disorder antedating the alcohol
use, and perhaps resulting in alcohol abuse; 9) the effects
of an independently transmitted affective disorder; and 10)
the effects of a genetically transmitted vulnerability to
both affective symptoms and alcoholism.
Jaffe and Cirulo emphasized in their review the
difficulty inherent in trying to investigate the relative
importance of these possible contributing causes, underlining
the difficulty in forming groups of alcoholics that are
comparable in terms of the origins of their depressive
symptoms,

pr~blems

in the diagnoses of personality disorders,

and problems in identifying the temporal order of onset in
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persons with both alcoholism and depression.

To this list of

difficulties can be added the differences in drinking history
and length of abstinence encountered in clinical studies with
alcoholics.

Not all of the causes for the high relationship

between alcoholism and depression suggested here are of
direct relevance to the present study.

Only two will be

described in further detail: biological predispositions to
both depression and alcoholism, and predisposing personality
characteristics.
The separation of primary depressives from other
depressed alcoholics is of special importance in biological
studies, because of its inferential value relative to
understanding the causal relationship between alcoholism and
depression.

At one time, the apparent high incidence of

primary depression in alcoholics and familial aggregation of
both major depression and alcoholism was seen from a
biological perspective as evidence that depressive and
dysphoric mood played a causal role in the development of
alcoholism, and that primary depression and alcoholism were
manifestations of the same underlying genetic vulnerability
(Bohman, Cloninger, von Knorring & Sigvardsson, 1984;
Merikangas, Leckman, Prusoff, Pauls, & Weissman, 1985;
Schuckit, 1979).

More recently, there is some evidence from

the same perspective that, by a process of assortative
mating, some individuals inherit independent predispositions
to alcoholism and or personality disorders (Bohman et al.,
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1984; Cadoret, O'Gorman, Troughton, & Heywood, 1985;
Lorantger & Tulis, 1985; von Knorring, Cloninger, Bohman, &
Sigvardsson, 1983).
Several theories accounting for alcohol addiction
suggest that alcohol is used to escape, or forget, painful
emotional experiences (such as depressed, tense affect)
rather than the drug primarily being used for its euphoria
inducing quality.

These theories stress the role of

predisposing personality characteristics, such as avoidance,
or unmet dependency needs (Freed, 1978).

Focusing on the

need to escape memories rather than a need to alter or escape
current experience, Cowan (1983) tested the hypothesis that
alcohol may permit the drinker to forget his previous
feelings, both good and bad, rather than make him feel
euphoric.

He hypothesized that the primary action of alcohol

on the emotional system may be to reduce the impact of past
experience by blocking emotional memories and associated
cognitions, keeping them from intruding on current
experience.

This would allow current experience to change in

accordance to the drinkers expectations and the drinking
situation, rather than being dominated by previous emotional
experience.

According to Cowan (1983):

Euphoric and dysphoric current feelings of various
types, as well as increased emotional !ability and
"disinhibition," can all result from a drug-induced
impairment (operationally, a decrease in accuracy) of
memory for particular kinds of feelings.
For the sober
problem drinker, many of these memories are related to
his problems, and are therefore unpleasant; forgetting
these may be particularly reinforcing.
(p.41).
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Cowan tested hypotheses related to his theory by using
in vivo alcohol doses either during a learning session or a
recall session.

He randomly assigned 32 non-alcoholic

students to one of four drug conditions over the two
sessions: placebo-placebo, placebo-alcohol, alcohol-placebo,
alcohol-alcohol.

Each

subject was administered the Profile

of Mood States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971) five
times: during session one before ingestion of drink, and at
the end of the session; during session two before ingestion
of drink, another for current mood at the end of the session,
and a final measure reflecting the subject's memory of the
POMS given at the end of the previous session.

The POMS is a

checklist containing 65 mood adjectives on six scales:
Tension-Anxiety, Depression-Dejection, Anger-Hostility,
Vigor, Fatigue, and Confusion-Bewilderment.
During each session, subjects participated in several
intentional verbal and pictorial memory tasks including free
recall of a word lists after one exposure, or several
exposures, and four-alternative forced-choice recognition of
pictures of men's faces.

None of the verbal and pictorial

memory tests resulted in significant effects due to alcohol
before testing, or before learning.

Alcohol produced no

significant changes in feelings of any of the POMS scales.
However, there were significant differences in
affective memory, as measured by the subjects' accuracy in
reconstructing previous POMS ratings.

Cowan divided memory
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error into two kinds: memory bias, or signed error in
estimates of the intensity of previous emotions; and
inaccuracy, or absolute error.

Both bias and inaccuracy

effects of alcohol ingestion on affective memories were
demonstrated.

Persons given alcohol during incidental

learning of moods (session one) exaggerated angry affect at
session two significantly more than other subjects.

Alcohol

ingestion during the learning session caused significantly
more inaccuracy on four of the six moods scales (Confusion,
Vigor, Depression-Dejection, and Tension-Anxiety, in order of
most inaccuracy).

Alcohol given before testing increased

inaccuracy for moods even more strongly, significantly
effecting Fatigue, Confusion, and Vigor, in descending order.
One significant interaction of learning and testing states
was in contrast to what might have been expected if
state-dependent retrieval had occurred: the same drug
condition groups showed less accurate memory for Vigor than
those that changed condition across sessions.

When Cowan

computed a "Total Memory Inaccuracy Score" by adding the
absolute value differences between learning and test session
POM's across the six scales, alcohol produced significant
effects both during learning and testing.
Cowan considers this study to be "the first study,
performed with a well established and extensively validated
mood scale, which demonstrates that alcohol directly affects
memory for feelings" (Cowan, 1983, p. 45).

He cites five
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lines of evidence from his experiment which indicate that
alcohol has specific and selective effects on memory for
emotional events beyond the general performance impairment
known to be caused by alcohol ingestion: 1) Alcohol's effects
on memory accuracy are stronger than those on memory bias; 2)
Alcohol has different pattern of effects on emotional memory
than on verbal and pictorial memory; 3) Alcohol's effects on
both learning and testing conditions are specific to certain
mood scales; 4)

Alcohol induced inaccuracy for moods does

not parallel the normal forgetting curve over time, therefore
alcohol does not merely potentiate the effects of time on
memory for moods; and 5) Alcohol does not alter current
feelings while impairing memory for earlier emotional events.
Cowan's research is important in that it attempts to
directly measure the psychopharmacological impact of alcohol
on memory for moods in order to establish a etiology for
pathological drinking that takes into account much that is
known clinically about the personalities of alcoholics.
However, procedural and measurement problems inherent in his
research has caused some workers to cast doubt on his conclusions.

His data have, in fact, been analyzed in a manner to

support the hypothesis that alcohol enhances memory for the
affect current immediately before the ingestion of alcohol
(Mueller & Klajner, 1984), supporting the view that persons
most at risk for alcoholism feel their best immediately before
intoxication (Parker, Birnbaum, Weingartner, 1980).
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If Cowan is correct, however, and alcohol use is at
least p·artially motivated by the reinforcing effects of
memory impairment, it is possible that depressive realism as
described by Alloy and Abramson (1979) has a causal role in
the development of some cases of alcoholism.

The

asymmetrical effects of alcohol on different kinds of
affective memories and the asymmetry of mood selectivity
effects on memory may also have a role in the development of
some variants of alcoholism.

Depressed persons may be

particularly vulnerable to the abuse of alcohol in order to
take advantage of its specific effects on affective memories,
which otherwise would intrude on ongoing experience,
unaltered by self-protective biases.

Some cases of

alcoholism, then, might result from alcohol use during
attempts at self-medication for excessive realism related to
depression.
Several theories have been reviewed to account for the
apparently high incidence of depression in alcoholics.

Some

investigatiors view this high incidence of depressive
symptoms as being related to the phase of the illness in
which alcoholics are apt to present for treatment.

They

suggest that alcoholics obtain treatment at times of reaching
"rock bottom", that is when severe physical and emotional
symptoms result in acute depression and distress that soon
lifts after detoxification.

A biomedical perspective

suggests that depression and alcoholism have a common
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physiological, perhaps genetic, basis that may also be
related to the development of personality disorders.
Personality traits predisposing individuals to both
alcoholism and depression have been suggested, such as
dependency, interpersonal ambivalence, and avoidance.
Finally, a theory related directly to alcohol's impact on
memory for affects was reviewed, suggesting that alcoholism
may result from reliance on alcohol to prevent intrusion of
negative affects, including depressed affect, into ongoing
experience.
Depression and Cognitive Performance
Hasher, Rose, Zacks, Sanft and Doren (1985) proposed
that there are two independent frameworks that make
predictions about the impact of depressed mood on performance
in the memory field.

One framework is based on limits in

capacity for cognitive tasks (Kahneman, 1973) with depression
reducing total capacity, or causing additional demands on
available capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).

The second

framework emphasizes the use of mood as a organizing
principle for processing new information and guiding
retrieval of memories (Beck, 1967; Kuiper, MacDonlad, &
Derry, 1983; Teasdale, 1986).

The solid empirical findings

supporting each framework are discussed under separate
sub-headings below.
Reduction of Cognitive Capacity Due to Depression
The cognitive literature on depression contains
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widespread reports that may be interpreted as declines of
capacity due to depression, including deficits in problem
solving, memory, and rate of learning (Dobson & Dobson,-1981;
Cohen, Weingartner, Smallberg, Pickar, & Murphy, 1982;
Stromgren, 1977; Weingartner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, &
Gerdt, 1981).
Specifically in alcoholics, some investigators note
that it is often difficult to separate the effects of
clinical depression and neurological impairment (Gass &
Russell, 1986; Hesserlbrock, Hesserlbrock, Meyer & Workman,
1983). Both depression and a history of alcohol abuse have
been demonstrated to lower both new learning and immediate
memory on psychological tests (Query & Megran, 1984).

Recent

investigations (Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983;
Riskind, Rholes, & Eggers, 1982) suggest that depressed mood
alone may interfere with the retrieval of positive (pleasant)
memories from Long Term Memory (LTM).

A more recent study

using more neutral materials (the Digit Span subtest from the
Wechsler Intelligence Scale-Revised and the Logical Memory
subtest from the Wechsler Memory Scale) found little
additional impact of depression above that of organicity,
including organicity due to alcohol abuse.

The investigators

concluded that the clinical lore associating depression with
memory impairment is mainly due to the exaggerated memory
complaints of depressed patients (Gass & Russell, 1986).
Gass and Russell reached a conclusion that appears to
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overlook the possibility that the neutral stimuli used by the
investigators would be least likely to uncover distortions
related to depression, which may be strongest when materials
are emotionally charged and personally relevant.

These are

the factors emphasized in the second major framework for
understanding the effects of depression on memory: the mood
selectivity framework.
Mood Selectivity Effects on Memory
Bower's (1980) work on mood and memory has proved
seminal in investigating the relationship between mood and
memory from the second framework described by Hasher et al.
(1985), that of mood as an organizing principle for encoding
and retrieval of memory contents.

Bower used hypnosis and

reading of emotionally charged self-reference statements to
induce happy or sad mood states prior to a memory task.

He

demonstrated that persons so induced had better recall for
material that was similar in evaluative content to their mood
state.

He has labeled this effect of better recall of

mood-congruent material a "mood-state- dependent memory"
effect.

Salience of material that is similar in content to

the induced mood has been demonstrated by Bower and
associated workers, and has been labeled "the mood congruity
.effect" (Bower, 1981).

Bower frames his work as an extension

of the Availability Heuristic Theory, and defined both
mood-state-dependent memory effects
effects as "automatic''.

a~d

mood congruity

His work is thus in part an

-
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extension of two theoretical perspectives used in the
preliminary study (Automatic Processing Theory and
Availability Heuristic Theory) by the inclusion of the
effects of mood on memory.

Although not of direct relevance

here, state dependent learning has been used in some models
to explain the addictive process and the unfolding of
affective memories in psychotherapy (Liard, Wagener, Halal &
Szegda, 1982).
In an experiment investigating memory for personal
episodes, Bower and associates had subjects record emotional
events in a diary for one week.

At the end of the week

period, hypnosis was used to induce either a pleasant or
unpleasant mood in subjects according to random assignment.
When subjects were asked to recall recorded emotional events,
the number of incidents recalled depended on the original
rating of the incident by the subject (either pleasant or
unpleasant) and the manipulated mood state at time or recall.
Percent of recall was highest for the unpleasant mood
condition for both kinds of incidents.

In both mood state

conditions, recall for incidents that had the same mood
content as the manipulated recall condition was much higher.
This effect was stronger in the pleasant mood condition, with
subjects recalling 92% more pleasant than unpleasant moods.
In the unpleasant mood condition the bias was less severe;
subjects recalled only 52% more unpleasant incidents than
pleasant incidents.
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Recently the generalizability of these mood dependent
effects has been called in question.

In a. series of three

experiments, Hasher, Rose, Zacks, and Doren (1985) attempted
to clarify whether depression reduces overall capacity,
whether mood congruent selectivity occurs, and if so, at what
point in the memory process (encoding or retrieval)
selectivity operates.

The methodology differed in these

experiments from other investigations in the mood and memory
with normal subjects in that the BDI and MCL were used to
form groups of naturally occurring depressed mood, rather
than resorting to some experimental induction of mood states.
The results across all three experiments were that no
significant differences were found between mildly depressed
college students and nondepressed students on recall of
verbal material of differing mood contents.
Bower and Mayer (1985a) have also reported a failure to
replicate mood congruent recall, using the original
methodology (Bower, Monteiro, & Gilligan (1978). This failure
contradicted Bower's (1981) theory of mood as an active
retrieval cue and led the authors to view mood dependent
recall "an evanescent will-o-the- wisp, and not the robust
outcome suggested by earlier reports." (Bower & Mayer, 1985a,
p.42).

Isen (1985) and Ellis (1985), commenting on these

failures to replicate, have stressed the importance of both a
possible asymmetrical effect for positive mood and negative
mood on memory, with negative mood having a less powerful
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selectivity effect than positive mood (Isen, Shalker, Clark,

& Karp, 1978), and the absence of a true continuity of mood
from clinical depression to mildly depressed college
students.

Hasher et al., (1985) do not view their findings

as evidence against mood congruent effects in clinical
populations, but as a caveat about the consistency of such
effects at a lower level in normals.
More recently, Bower and Mayer (1985b) have disagreed
with these critiques, arguing that differences in methods
between the experimental use of naturally occurring moods and
manipulated mood is a potent factor obscuring the detection
of such effects in a normal college population.

Also,

according to their model of spreading activation of
associates, it is the present mood state that is expected to
result in mood congruent effects, and Bower and Mayer suggest
that the BDI and MAACL used by Hasher et al., (1985)

are, in

part, trait measures of personality.
In an article examining the relationship between mood
state and severity of psychopathology in depression and
mania, Johnson and Magaro (1987) provided some interesting
concepts related to this debate.

In their review of the

literature, they found trends indicating unsystematic
cognitive disruption in mania, and increased severity of
pathology leading to increased memory deficit in both
depression and mania.

They found depressive performance on

recognition tasks as characterized by a conservative response
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bias, indicating that depressives had more stringent response
criteria for reporting recognition than did nondepressed
persons.

In regard to selectivity effects they concluded

that mood, not clinical depression, exerts the most profound
influence on the content of material recalled, cutting across
diagnostic categories. They conceptualized mood and severity
of affective disorder as discrete entities, although related.
Mood state may function in a somewhat autonomous manner from
diagnosis with regard to recall in memory.

They viewed mood

as analogous to a train yard switchman, determining the
direction of the "train of thought":
Therefore, memory content is hypothesized to be
determined by two dimensions, mood state and severity
of psychopathology. Both produce their effect by
altering the manner in which information is processed
--mood by providing contextual cues and schema
activation, severity through low levels of effort and
the disruptive effects of the presence or severity of
psychiatric illness.
In addition, we can further
hypothesize a relation between memory content in consciousness and mood, such that a positive feedback
loop is created (Beck, 1967; Bower,1981). That is,
mood increases the likelihood that thoughts present in
consciousness will be congruent with hedonic (mood)
state, which in turn will affect mood state such that
these thoughts will intensify the mood.(Johnson &
Magaro, 1987, p. 38).
In the terminology used earlier in this review, Johnson
and Margaro are suggesting that current mood influences
content and results in selectivity, whereas severity of
psychopathology influences capacity.

The current study

adopts a similar view of the independence of mood and
diagnostic severity by separating state depression from trait
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depression.

In addition to the capacity reducing effects of

depression, the present study incorporates the effects of
depressive realism on memory, to be described with the
learned helplessness literature, later in this review.
Depression and Memory for Freguency of Occurrences
Several studies have been conducted to investigate the
impact of depression on memory for frequency of occurrences,
often combining concepts and methods from both frameworks
described by Hasher et al. (1985).

Studies of contingency of

reinforcement can also be considered frequency studies, in
the sense that the subject's ability to distinguish the
frequency of reinforcement in the contexts of various rates
and types of responding are the focus of investigation.

From

this point of view, Alloy and Abramson's (1979) investigation
of perception of contingency in depression is a frequency
study, although the emphasis is on learning (especially
abstraction and generalization) rather than on·memory.
Perhaps the most influential investigation of the effects of
depression on frequency information from a memory framework
(with the emphasis on encoding and retrieval) is that of
Hasher and Zacks (1979).
Hasher and Zacks (1979) classified subjects as
depressed or nondepressed from scores on the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI).

Pictures of common objects were presented

at controlled frequencies over eight study trials.

Study

trials were alternated with imaginary trials to determine if
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the occurrence of imagined events would influence frequency
estimation of presented objects.

Results showed no

differences between depressed and nondepressed persons ..
Also, imagined trials increased the estimate of frequency
similarly in both .groups.

The authors concluded that

depression does not influence the ability to accurately
estimate event frequency.
Based on this finding related to depression and other
findings of no effect on memory for frequency of performance
on a large number of subject variables, and learning
conditions, Hasher and Zacks (1979) proposed that frequency
for memory of occurrences is one of several "automatic
processes" that place minimal demands on the capacity of the
cognitive processing system, and therefore are not influenced
by reductions in capacity, as are more capacity demanding
processes (named "effortful" or "controlled" processes in
their framework).
In an earlier attempt to clarify issues of capacity and
mood selectivity effects for depressed affect specifically
for memory for frequency of occurrences (the type of memory
investigated in the present study); Curt (1982) categorized
studies of frequency into two types: "frequency studies" and
"depression studies".

The primary focus of frequency

studies, in her typology, is the ability to make absolute or
relative judgments about the occurrence of specific stimuli,
using innocuous, neutral stimuli, usually
./
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Depression studies, on the other hand, use emotionallycharged events, feedback about performance, personally
relevant stimuli, and require judgments about the occurrence
of categories or types of items rather than individual item
frequency.

In a study designed to investigate the findings

of the two kinds of studies by combining all of their
elements into one design

(using pleasant, neutral, and

unpleasant self-statements, category judgments and item
frequency judgments) she found that depressed subjects (as
determined by BDI scores) did not differ significantly from
non-depressed subjects, either in the recall of items, or in
the accuracy of their judgments.

She interpreted the absence

of differences as being due to the non-reinforcing quality of
her stimuli (self-reference statements).
Another possibility for the absence of findings of
differences between depressed and nondepressed subjects in
this study (as well as Hasher & Zacks, 1979) is the use of
the BDI to form a "depressed" group from non-clinical college
students.

Recent research suggests that the BDI is not

appropriate for this purpose, due to its vulnerability to
social desirability effects and low correlation with
independent measures of depression (Tanka-Matsumi & Kameoka,
1986).

Hasher et al. (1985) suggests that a non-clinical

population is not appropriate for investigating naturally
occurring mood state and memory selectivity effects.

Also

Bower and Mayer's (1985b) proposition that mood biasing
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effects would most likely be detected using state measures is
relevant here.
The literature on the effects of depressed affect· on
cognitive performance have been reviewed from the point of
view of memory.

The typical findings in this area of

research have been shown to be related to two guiding
theoretical frameworks.

Two major interpretations of the

clinical relevance of these findings (learned helplessness
and depressive realism) will be reviewed in further detail.
Learned Helplessness Theory and Depressive Realism
The learned helplessness theory of depression is based
on the similarities between naturally occurring depression in
humans and human performance under conditions of being
exposed to noncontingent adversive events (Maier & Seligman,
1976; Seligman, 1976, 1975).

Under conditions of

noncontingent adversity, humans and animals behave as if they
have learned that their responding does not matter.

They

display a reduced incentive for initiating voluntary
responses and appear to show cognitive deficits in learning
future response-outcome contingencies.

Organisms that have

learned that outcomes are not contingently related to
responses, according to the learned helplessness theory,
demonstrate emotional disturbances similar to depression
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Miller, Rosellini, &
Seligman, 1977; Seligman, 1975a, 1975b; Seligman, Klein, &
Miller, 1976).
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Learned helplessness theory predicts that depressed
subjects will underestimate the degree of contingency between
outcomes and their personal responses.

Seligman and his

colleagues have tested this prediction by means of the
chance-skill method, a method involving a series of tasks
with outcomes that appear to be determined by either chance
or skill.

After performing several trials at each kind of

task, subjects report their expectations about future trials.
The typical finding in studies using this method is that
outcomes that appear to be dependent on responses have a
greater impact on expectancies for future success than chance
determined outcomes.
For example, Miller and Seligman (1976) exposed college
students to noise under three conditions: contingent noise,
noncontingent noise, and no noise.

In a later task with

contingent conditions, students exposed to noncontingent
noise showed less expectancy change toward success than other
students, which the authors interpreted as resulting from a
generalized learned expectancy of response-outcome
independence.

Similarly, depressed subjects have shown less

change toward expectancy of success after both success and
failure at a task than nondepressed subjects (Klein &
Seligman, 1976); and unipolar depressives have shown smaller
expectancy changes in a contingent task relative to other
hospitali~ed

a1., 1978).

control subjects and schizophrenics (Abramson et
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In an investigation of the learned helplessness model
of depression in an alcoholic population, O'Leary, Donovan,
Kreger, and Cysewski (1978) advanced reasons for their choice
of this population to investigate depression similar to the
reason advanced in the present study for viewing depression
as a factor in memory biases in alcoholics:
Alcoholics were chosen due to the high relation
between depression and this disorder (Weingold, Lachin,
Bell, & Coxe, 1968), the similarity between the
self-reported affect described by alcoholics and
depressives (Gibson & Becker, 1973), and the apparent
applicability of the learned helplessness model to this
population.
(p. 111).
Sixty-two male alcoholics in an inpatient rehabilitation unit were divided into low, medium, and high depression
groups based on Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) scores.
Procedures identical to those used by Miller and Seligman
(1973) were employed to create chance and skill tasks wherein
success or failure could be manipulated covertly by the
experimenters.

The chance condition consisted of a task

requiring the subject to predict which of two letters would
appear on a slide projector screen.

The skill condition

involved the manipulating of a string by the subject in an
attempt to raise a platform without causing a ball to fall
from its resting position on the platform.

Success was

controlled covertly by means of an electromagnet attached to
the platform and a metal strip attached to the ball.

In the
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chance condition success was manipulated by the experimenter
covertly choosing the advance or backward switch on the slide
projector.
Five dependent measures for each task condition were
developed to measure changes in expectancy : (a) an initial
expectancy of success self-rating, performed before the first
trial on a zero to ten scale, with zero indicating certainty
of failure, and ten indicating certainty of success; (b) The
difference in expectancy after the first trial;

(c) The total

value of "appropriate expectancy shifts" across ten trials
(i.e., the sum of increases in expectancies after a success
and decreases of expectancies after failures);

(d) the total

value of "inappropriate" shifts across trials (summed
increases in expectancies after a failure and decreases of
expectancies after success: an equivalent to the "gambler's
fallacy");

(e) the final expectancy after all trials.

Successes and failures were alternated, resulting in each
subject beginning with a success trial and ending in a
failure trial.
Unlike the results of Miller and Seligman (1973)
(wherein depressed college students showed consistently lower
expectancy shifts of the types described above) the only
significant differences were for task condition and end
expectancy.

The skill task condition resulted in

significantly higher expectancies for all levels of
depression.

Alcoholics with lower levels of depression had
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significantly higher end expectancies than those with higher
levels of depression.

Two significant correlations (£ <.OS)

of dependent measures with depression score were found: that

(£ = -.28), and that with end

with initial expectancy
expectancy (r = -.25).

The investigators concluded:

Contrary to Miller and Seligman's (1973) results and
Klein and Seligman's (1976) contention, present
findings do not support the direct applicability of the
learned helplessness model to a population of depressed
subjects with other forms of psychopathology. While
the self-reported affective features are apparently
similar between alcoholics and depressives (Gibson &
Becker, 1973); the present sample of depressed
alcoholics did not evidence the response-outcome
independent deficits in the skill task as previously
demonstrated by Miller and Seligman (1973) among
college students. (p. 112.)
Recognizing the challenge to his theory inherent in
these findings, Seligman (1978) requested that O'Leary
reanalyze the data using MMPI Hypomania scale as a controlled
variable to "purify" the BDI depression measure.

In a

personal communication, O'Leary informed Seligman that after
using post hoc blocking, the high-manic/high depressed
subjects demonstrated significantly higher expectancy shifts
than did low-manic/high depressed subjects, and that
depressed alcoholics showed higher initial expectancies and
final expectancies and are "more unrealistically optimistic
than matched depressives who are not alcoholic.
1978, p.168).

11

(Seligman,

Seligman interpreted these findings as

consistent with the learned helplessness modeling of
expectancy in depression.
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Seligman was correct in perceiving a threat to the
relevance of learned helplessness to understanding depressed
alcoholics in O'Leary et al.'s (1978) study, but may actually
be increasing that threat by his requested reanalysis.

A

reinterpretation of O'Leary et al.'s findings based on a
critique of the experiment's dependent measures, and the
relationship between expectancy and contingency clarifies the
consistency of the original results and the subsequent
reanalysis with the description of depressive realism later
offered by Alloy and Abramson (1978).

Such a critique and

reinterpretation are as follows:
In the described method, noncontingent outcomes
alternate in pairs, making the actual probability of success
(or failure) equal to .5.

Expectancy should be influenced

by contingency if subjects are responding "realistically".
Therefore, a totally realistic expectancy in the described
experiment, would be 5 on the described self-rating scale:
reflecting the actual probability of positive reinforcement
(.5) and the amount of control (none).

A criticism made

against many learned helplessness studies is relevant in this
case.

In both task conditions, outcomes are noncontingent:

the subjects are in fact helpless, yet expectancies which
appear to reflect recognition of this fact are interpreted as
due to a pathogenic process, learned helplessness.
The dependent measures of expectancy change were
designed to detect biases in the direction predicted by
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Seligman's theory, not to detect changes in expectancy as
reflections of accurate perception of contingency and rate of
reinforcement.

The raw expectancy means, however, are more

useful for examining expectancy as a reflection of
contingency and frequency of reward.

Assuming that initial

expectancy (with no knowledge of the task) may reflect
subject optimism, or pessimism more accurate perceptions of
contingency should have resulted in end expectancy means
closer to the self-rating scale mean of 5 than initial
expectancy means.

Inspection of the reported expectancy

means and correlations indicate that subjects with higher
levels of depression had end expectancies significantly
different than subjects with lower levels of depression, and
that were more consistent with contingency: i.e. were closer
to the expectancy scale mean of 5.

This was true in both

task conditions, but more strongly the case for the skill
condition.

The link between contingency and expectancy may

be as strong in the chance condition, but because of the
transparent lack of contingency in what could be described to
be a task of clairvoyance or telepathy, there was almost no
difference between the high depressed subjects' initial and
end expectancies, reflecting the maintenance of their initial
accurate perception of contingency.

In both conditions,

(wherein both the paraphernalia and outcomes approximate
events in a typical carnival game of chance} the higher end
expectancy means for the less depressed subjects may reflect
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these subjects' greater inability or unwillingness to
perceive the underlying contingency realistically.
Seligman, in his comments on this study, (1978) did
not report the expectancy means of the requested reanalysis
with hypomania as a controlled variable, and did not make it
clear how the comparison with non-alcoholic depressives was
accomplished (O'Leary et al.'s study included only alcoholic
subjects).

This leaves open the possibility that the

low-manic/high-depressed subjects were more realistic than
the high-manic/high-depressed subjects, if the former's lower
expectancy shifts were toward the scale mean of 5, reflecting
more

ac~urate

perception of the prevailing contingency and

frequency of reinforcement.
Note that this study (O'Leary et al, 1978)

challenges

the learned helplessness model and is consistent with the
description of depressive realism that later emerged from
such findings.

Alloy and Abramson's (1979) article was

seminal in suggesting that such findings may be related to
the absence in depressed subjects of normal selfprotective
biases.
Working within the framework of studying contingency of
reinforcement in learning, Alloy and Abramson garnered
evidence that raised serious challenges to the learned
helplessness model of depression.

In a set of four

experiments designed to investigate the relationship between
actual and perceived reinforcement, they examined depressed
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and nondepressed students' abilities to detect the degree of
contingency in a task under differing conditions of outcome
frequency and desirability.

Severity of depression was.

determined by use of the BDI.
In Experiment 1, the task used was making a green light
come on by the pressing of a button.

Each subject performed

different "problems" in estimating contingency (amount of
control) and rate of reinforcement (the lighting of the green
bulb) using this task, having been told that control and
number of green lights might vary between problems.

Subjects

were later asked to make judgments of the percent of control
(contingency) they had over the light coming on.
Experiment 1, the reinforcement

In the

was manipulated mechanically

to be negatively related to the actual degree of contingency,
which varied among the three problems performed by subjects.
Contrary to the predictions of the learned helplessness
model, ratings of contingency by the subjects were found to
be highly accurate, with no significant differences between
depressed and nondepressed subjects.
In Experiment 2, the subjects' task was the same, but
the experimental goal was to assess judgments of
noncontingency rather than contingency as in Experiment 1.
The learned helplessness model also predicted that depressed
persons would be accurate in assessing noncontingency,
whereas nondepressed persons would overestimate contingency.
Rates of reinforcement differed across problems in this
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experiment, but were noncontingent on subject responses.

It

was found that depressed persons were accurate in their
assessment of noncontingency regardless of level of
reinforcement.

Nondepressed persons, however, overestimated

contingency under high rates of reinforcement, but not under
conditions of low reinforcement (this trend being more
powerful for males than females), thus apparently providing
partial support for the learned helplessness model.
Experiment 3 was designed to further examine the
illusion of control found among nondepressives in Experiment
2. The task in this experiment was similar except the green
light was now associated with the gain or loss of money.

In

one problem, the light signified a 25¢ loss from an initial
$5 provided by the experimenter (lose problem).

In the other

problem, the light signified a 25¢ gain (win problem}.
Frequency of reinforcement was held constant across problems.
The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL) (Zuckerman &
Lubin, 1965) was used in combination with the BDI to form
depressed and nondepressed groups.

In addition the MAACL was

administered again both before and after each problem to
assess affect changes related to the rate of reinforcement
under noncontingency, yielding a depression change score, a
hostility change score, and an anxiety change score.
Depressed subjects accurately detected noncontingency of
their responses, whereas nondepressed people demonstrated
illusions of control.

Both groups judged reinforcement to be
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higher in the win problem.

Both groups showed significant

change toward dysphoria in the lose situation, with
nondepressed subjects showing greater change in the dysphoric
direction in the lose situation, and depressed subjects
showing greater change in the euphoric direction in the win
situation.

The investigators concluded from these findings

that under conditions of noncontingency involving hedonistic
rewards nondepressed subjects err by overestimating both
contingency and outcome frequency.
In Experiment 4, the learned helplessness model
hypothesis that depressed subjects would underestimate
contingency relative to nondepressed subjects under
hedonistic reward conditions was tested.

The procedure was

similar to experiment 3, but contingency was set at 50% in
both problems.

It was found that depressed subjects were

more accurate than nondepressed subjects in judging
contingency of reward.

Nondepressed subjects overestimated

control in the win problem (especially when the active
strategy of pushing a button was most effective) and greatly
underestimated control in the lose problem, whereas depressed
subjects were accurate about the degree of control regardless
as to amount of contingency or the kind of response that was
most effective in gaining reinforcement (actively hitting the
button, or passively not hitting it and waiting for
reinforcement).
Across all four experiments the learned helplessness
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hypotheses that depressed persons would underestimate control
and that nondepressed persons will overestimate control were
not supported.

Depressed subjects were consistently accurate

in their estimates of control, while nondepressed subjects
showed both illusions of control and illusions of no control
depending on experimental conditions.
Alloy and Abramson (1979) proposed a revision of the
learned helplessness model that would incorporate these
findings.

The revised hypothesis maintains that there is a

motivational deficit in depression that works without
perceptual distortion, that is depressives are less apt to
initiate successful responses, but are not less able to
perceive what the required response would be.

The revised

hypothesis predicts that depressed subjects will initiate
fewer instrumental responses when the required response is
complex, due to their motivational impairment.

The

helplessness experienced by depressives, according to the new
model, is not entirely due to the experience of
noncontingency filtered through perceptual, attributional,
and expectational processes, but may also result from
hormonal and physiological sources.
An alternative framework was also proposed to account
for the fact that nondepressives were inaccurate in
assessments of contingency.

Self-esteem maintenance and self

enhancement are the cornerstones of this alternative view.
The results in all four of Alloy and Abramson's (1979)

-
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seminal experiments can be explained if one hypothesizes that
nondepressed persons are motivated to maintain their
self-esteem, whereas depressed persons are not.

Roots to

this viewpoint include Bibring (1953) who argued that
depressives are not motivated to retain self-esteem because
the mechanism for self-deception has broken down.
Depressives have taken off their rose colored glasses, and
are "sadder but wiser" according to Alloy and Abramson
(1979).

The literature on self-esteem is consistent with the

view that persons with low self-esteem lack protective
perceptual biases.

Zuckerman (1979) concluded that

self-esteem is maintained by the kind of self-serving
attributional biases seen in nondepressed subjects.

An

attributional style of evenhandedness (willingness to
attribute success or failure equally to either the task
situation of to the self) has also been observed among
subjects with low self-esteem (Fitch, 1970; Ickes & Layden,
1978; Tennen, Herzberger, & Nelson, 1986).
The direction of the causal link between depression and
helplessness is still under debate in the depressive realism
literature.

Building on the revised version of the learned

helplessness model of depression which emphasizes the
perception and generalized expectancy of noncontingency in
the development of depression, Schwartz (1981, 1982) has
argued that helplessness can not lead to any form of
depression because non-depressed persons do not experience
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noncontingency even when it is present.

According to his

view, depression causes helplessness by producing a deficit
in initiating formal hypotheses about ongoing experiences,
and therefore preventing the usual bias toward confirmation
that accompanies hypothesis testing (Kahneman & Tversky,
1973).

According to Schwartz, it is actually an "inferential

handicap" that makes depressives appear "wiser".

He cites a

series of experiments by Reber (1967, 1968, 1976)
demonstrating that incidental learning of patterns and
abstract principles can be superior to intentional learning
of the same ideas, because of the distorting influences of
confirmation biases evoked by hypotheses generated by
subjects under intentional learning conditions.

He views the

depressed person as similarly operating permanently under
conditions of incidental learning because of a failure to
initiate hypotheses about the learning situation.

At least

one empirical study investigating the role of hypothesis
testing in judgments of contingency by depressive and
nondepressives supports Schwartz's view, in that depressed
subjects demonstrated the same biases as nondepressed persons
after they were provided hypotheses to test in relationship
to their judgments of contingency (Abramson, Alloy, &
Rosnoff, 1982).
Abramson and Alloy (1981) do not subscribe to this
view, but see the optimistic biases of nondepressives as a
pervasive aspect of human cognition that accounts for their
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inability to perceive noncontingency.

To them the depressive

does not possess a depressogenic bias: "but rather that he or
she suffers from an absence of nondepressive cognitive bias"
(Abramson & Alloy, 1981, p.444).

Recently, however, Abramson

and Seligman along with other researchers (Raps

et al.,

1982) have presented evidence that a depressogenic
attributional style (attributing causality of negative events
to internal, stable, and global causes) may lead to both
helplessness and to depression.
The present study addresses several issues raised in
the reviewed literature.

The high incidence of depression

among alcoholics suggests that some cases of alcoholism may
result from depression.

One line of investigation suggests

that the specific influences of alcohol on affective memories
may reinforce the abuse of alcohol among persons with
intrusive negative emotional memories, including memories of
depressed affect.

The literature on depression and cognitive

performance outlines several results of depressed affect on
and memory.

Total capacity may be reduced, resulting in

inaccuracy of memory.

Biased processing toward a depressive

world view may occur, resulting an increase of negative
emotional contents in memory.

The failure to produce

self-protective biases may cause depressed persons (and
therefore alcoholics that are depressed) to be more realistic
about previous events than others.

Considered together, the

reviewed research findings and theoretical formulations
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suggest that depression may have potent effects on memory,
and that differences in memory performance between alcoholics
and nonalcoholics that were demonstrated in the preliminary
study might be explained by differences in levels of
depression between the two groups.

CHAPTER III
THE PRESENT STUDY
General Assumptions
Although differing explanations of the relative
objectivity of depressed persons in various learning
situations continue to exist, the findings in the literature
described earlier are very similar to some of the findings in
the preliminary study.

The present study will investigate

the role of depression in memory differences between
alcoholics and nonalcoholics, by testing predictions based on
viewing depression as a mediator of cognitive biases and a
moderator of apparent cognitive deficits.

In order to do

this, a very complex interaction of many variables will be
limited to a focus on only a few.

Therefore, all systematic

error will be viewed as related to the effects of level of
depression (or conversely to the level of positive affect)
although there may be other sources of bias.

Similarly, all

unsystematic error will be viewed as related to cognitive
impairments, as was the case in the preliminary study.
The hypotheses to be tested assume two separate but
related depressive processes acting on memory and cognitive
strategies related to memory tasks.

None of the memory or

bias measures is expected to be solely influenced by one
51
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process and not the other.

Instead, each hypothesis about

the effects of depression requires an assessment of the
relevance of trait depression relative to the effects of
current depressed mood in the particular memory production in
question.

In general, the effects of depression on

memory

are expected to be stronger than state depression effects.
Trait depression is expected to interfere with selfprotective biases, which minimize negative events and
maximize positive events in memory, whereas state depression
is expected to increase depressive biases which maximize
negative events in memory.

Trait depression is seen as

primarily disruptive and limiting of normal cognitive
processes, whereas state depression is seen as primarily
productive of mood specific bias effects.
Alcoholics are expected to have a greater frequency of
negative affect over two weeks than the nonalcoholic
subjects, due to trait depression.

Trait depression and

(less significantly) cognitive inflexibility related to
cognitive impairments are expected to result in alcoholic
subjects having less mood variability over two weeks.

Trait

related depression effects are expected to result in higher
accuracy due to depressive realism, which in this context is
assumed to be due to the failure of self-protective biases.
A related prediction is made that the extremes of emotions
experienced by subjects will have less of a distorting impact
on memory for alcoholic subjects than for nonalcoholic

53

subjects.

The nonalcoholics, on the other hand, are expected

to have greater distortions in memory toward depicting the
self as happier, more confident, and secure, i.e., to
demonstrate self-protective bias.
State related depression is predicted to result in
overestimation of depressive content, resulting from the
greater availability of depressive items, via mood
selectivity effects on memory.

State depression and,

therefore, depressive bias is expected to be greater in the
alcoholic group.

The latter difference, moderated by trait

depressive realism and resulting from a weaker process, is
expected to be less dramatic and to be exhibited mainly in
the overestimation of negative moods.

This prediction is

made because trait depression related realism about negative
events and state depression selectivity for negative events
are expected to combine, resulting in increased
overestimation of negative moods.

The preliminary study

found that the groups did not differ significantly from each
other on positive mood item occurrence, but that the
alcoholics had significantly more negative mood occurrences.
Thus the selectivity effect for positive moods, although
perhaps stronger than the selectivity effects of negative
affect, is not expected to be different between groups,
whereas the (perhaps weaker) selectivity effect of negative
moods is expected to result in group differences in memory
estimates.
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The cognitive strategies used by subjects to perform
the memory task are also investigated in the present study.
Strategic processing of the memory task is assumed to be
reflected in the order in which subjects performed sub-items
of memory judgments about the occurrence of various bipolar
mood states.

Although the actual procedure used will be

described more fully in the Methods section, an example using
the bipolar item Happy-Sad will be used here to illustrate
the concepts the strategic processing measures.

Each bipolar

mood item was divided into three sub-items: judgments of the
rate of occurrence of positive affect (e.g., Happy), neutral
affect (e.g., neither Happy nor Sad), and negative affect
(e.g., Sad).

For each of ten mood items, subjects chose to

either perform the sub-items in the order presented on a
printed form, or to perform them in another order.
Deviations in sub-item performance from the order presented
to the subject is assumed to be the result of strategic
cognitive processing of the task.

Differences in strategic

processing are assumed to result in accuracy and bias
differences by order of sub-item performance.

Memory for

frequency of occurrences will be viewed as a function
requiring relatively low demands on cognitive capacity, i.e.,
will be considered an automatic process.

Strategic

processing is conceptualized here as a complex of cognitive
functions requiring relatively higher demands on cognitive
capacity, i.e., is considered a effortful process.
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Depression and alcoholism are expected to have some
negative impact on both amount of strategic processing and
unsystematic memory error (due to decreased motivation and
cognitive deficits respectively), but the present study will
focus only on the effects of depression.

Again, two separate

depressive processes are assumed, with trait depression
inhibiting any kind of processing, and state depression
inhibiting a tendency to process information along the
positive direction, i.e., to use the positive pole as the
first, or anchoring sub-item.

Although state depression is

assumed to produce increased processing along the negative
direction (i.e., to use the negative pole as the first, or
anchoring sub-item) this effect is assumed to be weaker than
the similar effect of positive mood, due to the asymmetrical
nature of mood selectivity effects.
Specific Hypotheses
Trait Depression Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1.

The alcoholic group will have a

significantly higher level of depression than the
nonalcoholic group, as measured by Scale 2 of the MMPI.
Hypothesis

1·

Alcoholic subjects will have

significantly lower self-protective bias scores than
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI)
as a mediating variable.
Hypothesis 3.

Alcoholic subjects will have
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significantly lower absolute accuracy of memory than
nonalcoholic subjects, after depression has been controlled.
Hypothesis 4.

Alcoholic subjects will have

significantly higher rates of negative affective states on
ESM records than nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will

be significantly attributable to trait depression (measured
by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating variable.
Hypothesis 5.

Alcoholic subjects will have

significantly lower variation in moods on ESM records than
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI)
as a mediating variable.
Hypothesis 6.

Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate in

their estimates significantly less sensitivity to extremes of
ESM mood state occurrence than will nonalcoholic subjects.
This difference will be significantly attributable to trait
depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating
variable.
State Depression Hypotheses
Hypothesis 7.

The alcoholic group will have a

significantly higher level of state depression than the
nonalcoholic group, as measured by the DEP scale of the SCL
90 at the time of the memory task.
Hypothesis 8.

Alcoholic subjects will have

significantly higher depressive bias scores than nonalcoholic
subjects.

This difference will be significantly attributable
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to state depression (measured by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a
mediating variable.
Hypothesis 9.

Alcoholic subjects will be significantly

higher than nonalcoholic subjects in overestimation of
negative moods but will not be significantly different in
overestimation of positive mood items.

This difference will

be significantly attributable to state depression (measured by
the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a mediating variable.
Strategic Processing Hypotheses
Hypothesis 10.

Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate

significantly less strategic processing of items in the
behavioral observations of their memory tasks than will
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait and state depression as mediating
variables.
Hypothesis 11.

Across groups, the first sub-item

judgement performed will be significantly different in
accuracy than subsequent sub-item judgments.
Hypothesis 12.

When overestimation and underestimation

are considered by order of sub-item judgment, the first
sub-item judgment will demonstrate significantly less
underestimation and significantly more overestimation than
other sub-item judgments.
Hypothesis 13.

Nonalcoholic subjects will demonstrate

significantly higher use of positive mood states as the first
sub-items performed in behavioral observations of their

memory tasks.
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This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait and state depression as mediating
variables.
Hypothesis 14.

Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate

strategic processing biases as stated in Hypothesis 13 to a
significantly lesser degree, but in the same direction as
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait and state depression as mediating
variables.

CHAPTER IV
METHOD
The Preliminary Study
The present study uses the self-report data and
accuracy scores from the preliminary study described in the
review of the relevant literature.

These data are combined

with archival data not used in the preliminary study
consisting of behavioral observations of the memory task and
psychological test data.

Although reported elsewhere

(Richards, 1986), the methods of the preliminary study will
be described here in considerable detail.
The preliminary investigation of memory for frequency
of occurrences in alcoholics, was part of a larger,
programmatic investigation of the recovery process begun in
November 1983, at Parkside Lutheran Center for Substance
Abuse in Park Ridge, Illinois.

This center is a private

hospital specializing in alcoholism treatment.

The center

was investigating patterns of recovery in alcoholics by use
of intensive self-reports measures and structured interviews.
The collection of much of the self-report data depended on
subjects carrying

long~range

pagers, used to cue their

completion of a standard self-report inventory.
Clinical subjects for this larger investigation were
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volunteers recruited from the inpatient population who met
two criteria: {a) geographic ease of access to the center for
periodic interviews and exchanges of experimental materials,
(b) the absence of any clinical judgment on the part of the
treatment team that participation would be disruptive of the
potential subject's adjustment after discharge, and (c) the
absence of psychopathology so severe that it would preclude
meaningful participation.

Potential subjects excluded from

recruitment due to the second criteria were extremely rare.
Subjects were introduced to the experiment's purpose and
methods in an information meeting, where the voluntary nature
of their participation, confidentiality of subject
information, and the independence of the study from the
facility's treatment activities were emphasized.

Participat-

ing subjects received a total of $50 for transportation
and other expenses related to their participation.

This

involved two disbursements, one of $20 at discharge and
a second of $30 at the investigator's receipt of all
experimental materials at the completion of the 90-day
participation.
A community sample was recruited from the surrounding
residential area to serve as a nonalcoholic comparison group.
These subjects received $25 at the end of their two-week
participation.

An attempt was made to obtain a reasonably

representative sample across the age, gender, and SES ranges
typically served by the center.

When subjects agreed to

-
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participate, they were given several standard psychological
tests, including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality
Inventory (MMPI).

All subjects participated under a signed

consent and all experimental procedures were reviewed and
approved by the hospital's Human Subjects Committee, and were
in accordance with the ethical guidelines of the American
Psychological Association (APA).
The clinical subjects were randomly assigned to one of
three groups.

Subjects in Group I carried the pager each day

for the entire 90 days.

Subjects in Group II followed the

same protocol of filling out self-reports when paged, but
carried pagers on a two weeks "on," two weeks "off" schedule.
Subjects in Group III served as a clinical control group and
did not carry a pager at any time.

In addition to day-to-day

self-reports, Groups I and II were assigned contact schedules
for brief biweekly, on-site testing and

interviews,

alternating with biweekly telephone contacts conducted by
trained, supervised research assistants.

Group III was

assigned only one telephone contact per month·and a final
on-site interview with testing.
For Groups I and II and the nonalcoholic group, a
random sample of the subject's moods and experiences was
obtained by means of long-range papers that were triggered
randomly four times per day between the hours of 8:00 am. and
10:00 p.m., seven days per week.

Subjects who were scheduled

to be "on the beeper" for a given period were to complete a
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Daily Activity Report each time they were paged.

This report

is a self-report measure of mood states, thoughts, and
experiences, based on the Experience Sampling Form

(ESF), an

inventory designed to be used to systematically sample
experience by periodically cueing self-reports (Figure 1).
The ESF includes items composed of adjectives describing mood
state opposites on each pole of a Likert scale.

Subjects

indicated their mood state and its intensity by placing a
mark somewhere along the continuum formed between the two
mood extremes.
At the end of two weeks of participation, subjects
completed a series of self-report inventories including the
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) (Derogatis, 1977).

During the

same session, subjects performed a memory task requiring
estimates of the percent of occurrence of
recorded mood states.

their previously

These estimates were collected by

means of a paper and pencil instrument titled "Memory Task
Moment-to-Moment Beep", which divided the above described
bipolar adjective items into three categories of mood
occurrence: the percent of one mood state, the percent where
neither mood item applied, and the percent of the opposing
mood state (Figure 2).

For example, the Alert-Drowsy bipolar

adjective item on the ESF is divided into three ranges: (a)
very to somewhat alert; (b) neither alert nor drowsy; and (c)
somewhat to very drowsy.

Subjects were told to estimate the

occurrence of their recorded moods in percentages, with 100%
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Figure 1.

Modified

Exn~rience

Sampling Form

What were you thinking a b o u t ? - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Where were you?
What was the MAIN thing you were doing?

-----------------------------------------~

·Not at

Somewhat

all

How much choice did you have in
selecting-this activity?
Did you feel in control of your
activity?
How guilty did you feel?
How vulnerable did you feel?
How self-conscious were you?
How much were you concentrating?
How satisfied did you feel with
yourself?

Quite

Very

+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+
0

1

2

6

5

3

Describe your mood as you were beeped:
Very Quite Some Neither Some Quite Very
0
Alert
0
0
0
~appy

0

0

0

0

Irritable
Strong
Angry

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Active
Lonely
Adequate
Free
Excited
Proud
Confused
Tense
Fat

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

7

8

Drowsy
Sad
Cheerful
Weak
Friendly
Passive
Sociable
Inadequate
Constrafned
Bored
Ashamed
Clear
Relaxed
Thin

9
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Figure 2.

Check one:

Memory Task Moment-to-Moment Beep

D

Total Period

D First 2 Weeks D Last 2 Weeks

General Questions:
1.

What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book
_ _%
on the EXTREME RIGHT of the mood rating form?

2.

What percentage of the time did you mark (fill out) your book
_ _%
on the EXTREME LEFT of the mood rating form?

3.

What percentage of the time did you mark the POSITIVE items on
the mood rating form?
_ _%

4.

What percentage of the time did you mark the NEGATIVE items on
the mood rating form?
_ _%
Percentage of Responses

Mood Questions
very
0

alert
happy
irritable
strong
angry
active
lonely
proud
confused
tense

quite

some

neither

some very
0

0

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

_%

quite
0

drowsy
sad
cheerful
weak
friendly
passive
sociable
ashamed
clear
relaxed

Percentage (%) of Responses
Not at all/Somewhat
Quite/Very
How preoccupied were you with eating?
_ _%
_%
How preoccupied were you with drinking/
using?
_ _%
_%
How confident did you feel about your
ability to resist the urge to drink/
use?
_ _%
_%
Did you share your feelings with someone
close to you?
_ _%
_%

-
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being the total number of times they responded to the bipolar
adjective over the two week recording period.

Graduate level

research assistants administered the task according to ·
written directions designed to impress on the subject that
memory was to be used to perform the task, rather than some
other strategy, such as guessing what one might have recorded
(See Appendix A).
As subjects performed the above described memory task,
the order in which they did the three sub-items tallying to
100% for each bipolar mood item was observed by the research
assistant, after the preliminary instructions that they were
allowed to perform ~he sub-items in any order they chose.
These observations were recorded by the experimenters, as
unobtrusively as possible on a standard observation record
(Figure 3).
Accuracy measures were constructed by comparing each
subjects estimates and recorded mood percentages in each
category.

A measure of relative accuracy, the discrimination

coefficient, was formed by finding the correlation between
estimates and actual mood occurrences.

Difference scores

were used to measure the amount and direction of error on
each judgement.

These accuracy measures resulted in the

patterns of group differences described earlier in the review
of the literature.

Means and standard deviations by group of

these variables are available in
B-3).

~ppendix

B (Tables B-1, B-2,

Figure 3.
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Behavioral Observation Record.
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION OF
MEMORY TEST

We want to observe and record the sequence of the answers
to the mood and preoccupation/confident/feeling questions.
As the subject fills out the form, observe how they
complete these sections and record that information as
follows:
1 =FIRST CHOICE

2 = SECOND CHOICE

3 = THIRD CHOICE

Columns
One

Two

Three

alert
happy
irritable
strong
angry
active
lonely
proud
confused
tense
Not at all/ somewhat = 1
Quite/very = 2
First
Preoccupied eating
Preoccupied drinking/using
Confident
Shared feelings

Second
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The Present Study
Subjects
All subjects were participants in the larger
investigation of memory accuracy described above.

Subjects

consisted of 22 alcoholics and 22 nonalcoholics. Alcoholic
subjects were selected at random from a larger pool of Group
I and Group II subjects in the context study that had
completed two weeks of participation and had taken the memory
task.

All nonalcoholic subjects that completed the two week

participation period and the memory task were included in the
present study.
The alcoholic group consisted

~f

11 white males, 10

white females, and 1 black male; whereas the nonalcoholic
group consisted of 10 white males, 10 white females, 1
oriental/white female, and 1 black male. The alcoholic group
contained 19 persons whose level of education was at or above
that of high school graduate, 2 persons who had below a high
school education, and 1 person for whom this data was not
available; whereas the nonalcoholic group consisted entirely
of high school graduates.

The alcoholic group's mean age was

32.0 years with a standard deviation of 9.1 years, whereas
the nonalcoholic group's mean age was 26.4 with a standard
deviation of 7.8 years.
Archival Data
Archival data of several types were obtained for each
of the 44 subjects.

These data consisted of demographic

-
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characteristics, records of mood over two weeks, memory
accuracy scores, behavioral observations of the memory task
and depression scores from the MMPI and SCL 90.

Several of

these sets of data have been described above under the
description of the preliminary study.

The ESF as a measure

of mood, and not simply as a target stimuli for memory will
be described below, along with relevant reliability and
validity characteristics of the ESF, the MMPI Scale 2, and
the SCL 90 DEP scale.
The Experience Sampling Form: A Record of Mood Occurrences
Mood state data for the present experiment were
collected by means of the experience sampling method (ESM)
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984).

The method was developed

to study the subjective experience of individuals interacting
in natural environments, with an attempt to insure ecological
validity.
Long range pagers are used to cue subjects to complete
self reports of thoughts, moods, activities and other aspects
of experience.

The pagers are activated, usually by radio,

at random intervals during the day, resulting in the cue
being unexpected by the subject.

Studies using the ESM have

inc1-uded studies of the phenomenology of everyday life
(Klinger, 1978; Hurlburt, 1979); changes in self-esteem
(Savin-Williams & Demo, 1983); variation in self-awareness
(Franzoi & Brewer, 1984); frequency and intensity of moods
(Diener & Larsen, 1984; Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984) and
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recovery process in alcoholics (Filstead, Reich, Parrella &
Rossi, 1985).
In addition to long distance pagers, the ESM utilizes
standardized self-report forms, the Experience Sampling Form
(ESF).

The form is designed to take no more than 90 seconds

to complete.

Items include questions about the time when

the form was completed, and the environmental circumstances,
subject's thought content, and ongoing activities.

In

addition, the form contains a number of Likert scales
measuring mood states, levels of arousal, and other
self-perceptions.

Item content may vary slightly depending

on the area of interest of the researchers.

For the present

study, the original form was slightly modified, with
additional questions about substance use, abstinence related
activities, and preoccupation with using drugs or alcohol
were added (See Figure 1).
Although of the reliability of ESF data is a complex
question, they are highly consistent across time within the
same individual and within similar activities and situations,
while differing significantly among various individuals,
situations and activities. The.median correlation coefficient
on the original eight Likert scale variables has been
reported as .60 for adolescents and .74 for adults
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984).

For ESF data of German

high school students across one week, Pawlik and Buse (1982)
reported correlation coefficients of .57 for locations, .76
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for moods, and .80 for motives.

Individual consistency over

two years for 28 adolescents was unexpectedly high, with
test-retest correlations of individual items ranging from .45
to .75 (Freedman, Csikszentmihalyi, & Larson, in press).
The ESF has demonstrated high concurrent validity with
physiological measures (such as heart rate and physical
posture), activities (such as work versus play), and social
contexts (such as being with friends versus being alone).
For example, measures of affect and arousal decrease
dramatically when subjects are alone, while measures of
friendliness and sociability increase when at school for
normal adolescents (Larson, 1979).

Convergent validity of

the ESF with a variety of other psychometric instruments have
been demonstrated, including

measures of alienation

(Gianinno, Graef, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1983); work
satisfaction (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1985); intimacy
needs (McAdams & Constantian, 1983); intrinsic enjoyment
(Hamilton, Haier, & Buchsbaum, 1984); and self-esteem (Well,
1985).

The ESF has shown strong predictive validity in

distinguishing group membership based on item responses.
Schizophrenics and non-schizophrenics (Csikszentmihalyi

& Larson, 1984); bulemic women and normal women, (Larson &
Johnson, 1985); light and heavy T.V. viewers (Kubey, 1984);
and underachievers and achievers in high school performance
(Robinson, 1985); have been demonstrated to have
significantly different ESF profiles.

In addition, ESF
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reports have detected expected significant differences in
ideographic studies of perception and experience before and
after important life events, such as a suicide attempt
(Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1984); a marital separation
(Wells, 1985); and personality alternations in a case of
multiple personality (Hamilton et al., 1984).
Depression Measures
Several general issues are relevant to evaluating the
appropriateness and validity of the specific measures of
depression used in the present study.

Screening for the

presence of depression and depressive symptoms is often
accomplished by means of self-rating scales.

Cut-off scores

on these scales are used to determine whether the diagnosis
of depression is warranted in any given case. Instruments
often used for this purpose include the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI) (Beck, 1967); the Minnesota Multiphasic
Personality Inventory, Scale 2 for depression (MMPI-D)
(Hathaway & McKinley, 1951); the Hamilton Depression Scale
(Ham-D); the Raskin Depression Scale (Raskin et al., 1969)
the Mood Assessment Scale (MAS) (Yesavge et al., 1983); the
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS) (Zung, 1965), and the
Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90) (Derogatis, 1977).
Correlations among these self-rating scales tend to be
moderate (.60 to .93) (Willenbring, 1986).

The wide range of

estimates for the occurrence of depression in alcoholics (3%
to 98%) has been interpreted as in part related to the lack
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of agreement among the various scales used for the purpose of
diagnosis (Weissman & Meyers, 1980). Willenbring (1986)
argues that, ideally, these instruments should be both
sensitive to true positive cases and result in few false
positives when depression as determined by the current
diagnostic system (DSM-III) is used as a criterion.

Yet this

is currently not the case (Hesselbrock, Hesselbrock, Tennen,
Meyer, & Workman, 1983).
Instruments differ from each other and from the DSM-III
in the way in which depression is conceptualized.

For

example, in a study of the factor structure of the BDI and
the SDS, Gibson and Becker (1973) found that although the
factors present in alcoholics were for the most part similar
to those in depressed patients, an additional factor that
they labelled endogenous depression did not occur to the same
extent in the data for the alcoholics, suggesting that the
alcoholics might exhibit the cognitive disturbance associated
with depression, without having a true endogenous depression.
Since the DSM-III criteria rely heavily on endogenous-type
symptoms to determine the diagnosis of depression, any
self-report inventory that measures depressive factors other
than the endogenous factor may have a low correlation with
criterion, yet nonetheless, reflect a kind of depression.
The measures of depression and affect used in the
pres~nt

study consisted of one trait depression measure, the

MMPI, and one state depression measures, the SCL 90, and one
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measure of general affect over time, the Daily Activity
Report form of the ESF.

The appropriateness, validity, and

reliability of each of these measures will be reviewed ..
The MMPI Scale 2 as a Measure of Trait Depression. The
MMPI is commonly used as a measure of

depression in studies

of depression in alcoholics (Dinning & Evan, 1977; Query and
Megran, 1984; Willenbing, 1986).

The MMPI is an instrument

with an extensive literature, most of which reflects its
sound convergent and discriminant validity as a measure of
personality traits and symptom patterns (Wiggins, 1966, 1969;
Wiggins, Goldberg, & Applebaum, 1971).

Although at times

used to measure short term symptom patterns, the MMPI was
designed and is most typically used to measure enduring
personality traits (such as trait depression) and
longstanding symptom patterns.
Although the MMPI-D was not originally designed to be
used alone to discriminate

depress~ves

elevation of the D scale (T-score

= 70,

from nondepressives,
over two standard

deviations above the mean) is often used alone or in
combination with other elevations as an indication of
depressive symptoms (Nerviano et al., 1980, 1981).

D scale

(Scale 2) contains items reflecting a broad range of
depressive symptoms, including dysphoric mood and affect,
withdrawal, apathy, somatic concerns, ahedonia, lack of
motivation, feelings of hopelessness, suicidal ideation and
other cognitive expression of depression.
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Based on the criterion of MMPI-D T score greater than
70 indicating depression, estimates of the percent of
alcoholics categorized as depressed range from 43%
(Hesselbrock et al., 1883) to 62% (Zeeler et al., 1979).

In

one study comparing the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and
the MMPI-D in their ability to accurately predict alcoholics
diagnosed as also having depression as conceptualized in the
DSM-III and as determined by the National Institute of Mental
Health Diagnostic Interview Schedule (NIMH-DIS), neither
instrument agreed well with the DSM-III, but were moderately
correlated with each other (£ =.59) (Hesselbrock et al.,
1983).

The investigators interpreted the finding of only a

moderate correlation between the MMPI-D and the BDI as due to
differences in time frames, symptom-clustering criteria,
formats, and modes of administration between the two
instruments.

Willenbring (1986) found that the agreement

among the MMPI-D, BDI and Ham-D was not high (r

=

.4),

suggesting to him that they measure related but distinct
phenomena, and cited evidence that the BDI is more sensitive
to state symptoms rather than enduring personality patterns.

State Measures of Depression: the Symptom Checklist
90.

The Symptom Checklist 90 (SCL 90; Derogatis, 1977) is a

multidimentional self-report inventory comprised of 90 items,
each rated on a five-point dimension of distress (0 to 4)
from "not at all" to "extremely".

The instrument consists of
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items comprising nine symptom dimensions and seven items that
do not load on any symptom dimension.

The symptom

dimensions are Somatization (SOM), Obsessive-Compulsive·
(O-C), Interpersonal Sensitivity (INT), Depression (DEP),
Anxiety (ANX), Hostility (HOS), Phobic Anxiety (PHOB),
Paranoid Ideation (PAR), and Psychoticism (PSY).

Items in

each dimension have face validity with these titles. From
responses to these dimensions and the seven additional items,
three global indices of pathology are calculated.

The global

indices are the Global Severity Index (GSI), the Positive
Symptom Distress Index (PSDI) and the Positive Symptom Total
(PST).
The GSI is considered by the test author to be the best
single indicator of the current level of pathological
symptoms, and is the grand total of the summed distress
scores for the 9 symptom dimensions and additional items.
The PST reflects the range of problems identified by the
subject, and is the count of non-zero responses to the 90
items.

The PSDI is a measure of average intensity of

distress, and is the mean level of non-zero responses.

The

discriminant and convergent validity of the SCL 90 has been
investigated with both outpatient subjects and inpatient
subjects (Dinning & Evans, 1977).

The nine symptom

dimensions have been shown to have peak correlations (r

~

with analogous MMPI scales while correlating to a lesser
degree (£
1976).

<

.4) with nonanalogous scales (Derogatis et al.,

4)
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The SCL 90 was developed for use with an outpatient
medical and psychiatric population, and its use with
inpatient populations has been questioned (Steer & Henry,
1979) as has the use of many popular self-report measures of
depression with non-clinical samples (Tanka-Matsumi &
Kameoka, 1986).

Nonetheless, the SCL 90 is

sometimes used

for measuring depression and other kinds of distress in
alcoholics and prototypical symptom profiles for alcoholics
have been developed, with alcoholics typically having profile
peaks on DEP as well as the Anxiety and Phobia dimensions and
lowest symptom scores on Hostility (Derogatis, 1977).

This

may be compared to profiles for depressed patients from the
same source, who tended to have peaks on
Obsessive-Compulsive, Depression, and Anxiety with the lowest
score tending to be on Hostility.
Several studies have investigated the factor structure
of the SCL 90 (Cyr, 1979; Derogatis & Cleary, 1977;

Evanson,

Holland, Metha, & Yasif, 1980; Hoffman & Overall, 1978;
Holcomb, Adams, & Ponder, 1983) with various results, leading
several investigators to conclude that the SCL 90 might best
be seen as a general measure of distress, rather than
possessing the ability to measure types of distress as
suggested by its various dimensions.

Despite these

reservations, for the purposes of the present study, it is
important to note that all factor analytic studies of the SCL
90 have found at least one viable Depression factor, and two
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studies (Hoffman & Overall, 1978 ; Holcomb et al., 1983)
found an Insomnia factor that was highly

correlated with the

Depression factor.
The DEP dimension is used as a measure of depression in
the current study and is therefore of special interest.

It

consists of 12 items appearing in Table 1.
In an inpatient population, one study (Dinning &
Evans, 1977) found the correlation between BDI and SCL 90 DEP
to be high (£
moderate (£

=

=

.7) and its correlation with the MMPI-D to be

.4).

The same study also found significant

correlations of the SCL 90 dimensions and the L and K scales
of the MMPI, indicating that defensiveness and dissimulation
result in lower scores on the SCL 90 scales while "fake bad"
response sets result in higher scores for distress on the SCL

90.
In a study more relevant to alcoholic patients,
Rounsaville, Weissman, Rosenberger, Wilber and Kleber (1979)
examined the specificity and sensitivity of five depression
screening scales in young drug abusers.

The SCL 90 was found

to have a 94% true positive rate for current depression, as
determined by the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) (Spitzer
and Endicott, 1978)i with most false positive occurring in
persons with a history of depression.
In summary, despite a lack of agreement of how specific
measures should best be used to measure _depression, there is
sufficient evidence that the trait measure (the MMPI Scale 2)
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Table 1
·rtems of the SCL 90 Depression Dimension

No.

5

Symptom Item

Loss of sexual interest or pleasure

14

Feeling low in energy or slowed down

15

Thoughts of ending your life

20

Crying easily

22

Feeling of being trapped or caught

26

Blaming yourself for things

29.

Feeling lonely

30

Feeling blue

31

Worrying too much about things

54

Feeling hopeless about the future

71

Feeling everything is an effort

79

Feelings of worthlessness

78
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and state measure (the SCL 90) to be used in the present
study have considerable reliability and validity as measures
of depression.

Also, the ESF both measures mood states· over

time with demonstrated sound reliability and validity.
Procedure
Several measures of accuracy and bias were constructed
for the purposes of the present study from
difference and signed difference scores.

archival absolute
For each subject

composite scores for memory accuracy on positive items and
memory accuracy on negative items were constructed by
calculating the mean absolute error for items of each type.
Four scores reflecting bias were calculated by finding the
total overestimation and total underestimation for each mood
type, positive and negative.

From these four scores two

measures of hypothesized cognitive biases were constructed.
Depression bias scores were constructed by summing the
overestimation of negative moods and the underestimation of
positive moods.

Self-protective bias scores were formed by

summing the overestimation of positive moods and the
underestimation of negative moods.
The recorded behavioral observations of the memory task
were used to develop several measures reflecting strategic
processing.

The total number of sub-items performed in the

identical order as they appeared on the memory task form was
used as a measure of degree of strategic processing, with
lower scores indicating more strategic processing.

The
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number of items in which the first performed sub-item was the
last presented sub-item on the memory task form was also used
as a measure of increased strategic processing.

Two

me~sures

of the direction of strategic processing were calculated: the
number of times that a subject performed negative sub-items
when a positive sub-item was presented, and similarly, the
number of times that positive sub-items were performed
initially after a negative sub-item was presented on the
memory form.
MMPI Scale 2 T scores were extracted from the archive
for each subject, as were SCL 90 DEP Scale mean intensity
scores, demographic data,

and ESF records.

Analyses were

performed to demonstrated hypothesized group differences on
relevant variables, and to demonstrate the relationship of
those differences to depression.

CHAPTER V
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Demographic Data
Group differences in educational level, gender and race
were examined by means of the chi-square statistic, resulting
in no significant differences between groups on any of these
demographic variables.

When age differences were examined,

however, alcoholic subjects were found to be significantly
older than nonalcoholic subjects.

The mean age in the

alcoholic group was 32.0 with a standard deviation of 9.1
years~

whereas the nonalcoholic group mean age was 26.5 with

a standard deviation of 7.8 years, t(42)

=

2.15, E

<

.04.

These variables are summarized in Table 2.
To assess the strength of relationship of age with
variables of interest other than group status, the correlation
coefficients between age and other variables (i.e. demographic
variables, measures of memory accuracy and bias, and measures
of depression) were calculated.
were obtained.

No significant cor1 :ations

Despite this evidence of only a weak relation-

ship of age with other variables of interest, age was used as
a covariate in subsequent analyses of group differences,
because of the possibility of significant interactions.
81
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Table 2
Demographic Data by Group.

variable

Group
Alcoholic
(N

Mean Age

=

22)

32.0 (9.1)

Nonalcoholic
(N

=

26. 4 ( 7. 8) *

Gender
Males

11

11

Females

11

11

White

21

20

Other

1

2

High School or Higher

19

22

Less than High School

2

0

Information not available

1

0

Race

Education

~·

*

·-

.E ~ 05

22)
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Memory Bias and Memory Accuracy Scores
Memory estimates and recorded mood occurrences were
compared to produce several measures of memory accuracy· and
memory bias.

Three measures of memory accuracy were of

interest: discrimination coefficients, absolute error on
positive mood items, and absolute error on negative mood
items.

Discrimination coefficients for overall relative

accuracy were found by computing the correlation of memory
estimates to corresponding mood occurrences across each
subject's memory task form.

Mood items were divided into two

types: positive moods and negative moods.

The positive mood

items were Alert, Happy, Strong, Actiye, Proud, Cheerful,
Friendly, Sociable, Clear, and Relaxed.

The negative mood

items were Angry, Irritable, Lonely, Confused, Tense, Drowsy,
Sad, Weak, Passive, and Ashamed.

The two absolute accuracy

measures were calculated by summing absolute differences
between memory estimates and mood occurrences across items
for each mood content type.
Measures of memory bias were calculated from signed
differences between each subject's memory estimates and
corresponding mood occurrences.

Two overestimate variables

were formed by calculating the mean of negative signed
differences for each mood item type.

Two underestimate

variables were similarly calculated from differences with
positive signs.

A measure of depression bias was formed by

summing overestimation of negative items and underestimation
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of positive items.

A measure of self-protective bias was

formed by summing underestimation of negative items and
overestimation of positive items.
The measures of memory accuracy and bias described here
were used as the dependent measures for testing specific
hypotheses about the relationship of depression to cognitive
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics.
depression and trait depression

State

were expected to have

different effects on each memory measure.

The means and

standard deviations of these measures of accuracy and bias
are reported by group in Table 3, along with. the same
information for the measures of depression to be discussed
below.
Measures of Trait and State Depression
The MMPI Scale 2 T-score was obtained for each subject,
as was the mean intensity score on the DEP Scale of the SCL
90. The means, standard deviations, and significant
differences as determined by t-tests for these two variables
is reported in Table 3.

Alcoholic subjects had significantly

higher trait depression scores, t(42) = 2.30, E

~

.03.

The

alcoholic group also had higher state depression, although
the difference between group means was not significant.

When

the cut-off of MMPI Scale 2 T-score greater than or equal to
70 was used to categorize subjects as trait depressed, no
nonalcoholic group subjects were categorized as clinically
depressed, whereas 8 alcoholic subjects (5 females and 3
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Table 3
Measures of Accuracy, Bias, and Depression

Group

Measure
Alcoholic
(N

=

M

2 2)
SD

Nonalcoholic
(N

=

2 2)
SD

M

Depression Measures
MMPI Scale 2

63.7 (16.3)

SCL 90 DEP

.850

(.686)

54.2 ( 11.0) *
• 6 25

(.631)

Accuracy Measures
Absolute Error: Positives

15.7 ( 5.6)

Absolute Error: Negatives

11. 5 ( 6.2)

Discrimination Coefficient

.80 (

• 18 )

16.8 ( 13.5)
8.3 ( 3.9) *
.83 (

. 15)

Bias Measures
14.5

8. 7)

Underestimation: Negatives

7.0

4.9)

5.9 ( 3.7)

Overestimation: Positives

7.5

5.5)

10.0 (11.1)

11. 0

8. 7)

Self-Protective Bias

Depression Bias

15.9

6.8

9.4)

5.7)

Overestimation: Negatives

4.7 ( 5.2)

2.3 ( 2. 8)

Underestimation: Positives

6.5

4.3

~·

MMPI Scale 2 units are T-scores.

mean intensity scores.

*

.l2

~ .05.

• 9)

DEP scale units are

All other non-correlational variables

are measured in percent in error.
~-

6.0)
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males) were so categorized.

When the same T-score on the SCL

90 DEP scale was used to categorize persons as state
depressed using the norms for psychiatric outpatients, no
subject's score reached criterion.

When the nonpatient norms

were used, 3 nonalcoholic subjects (1 male and 2 females) and
3 alcoholic subjects (1 male and 2 females) were categorized
as state depressed.

Only one subject had clinical levels of

depression on both state and trait measures, a 27 year old
white female, who also had the highest frequency of negative
affect among all subjects (55.14%) and the second highest
discrimination coefficient (.95 compared to the highest of
.96).
Correlational analyses were conducted to investigate
the assumption that these measures of state and trait
depression were significantly related to measures of memory
accuracy and bias.

The results of these analyses are

summarized in Table 4.

Both trait and state depression had

significant correlations at the .05 level with several
measures of accuracy and bias.

For trait depression

significant correlations occurred on absolute error on
negative items (£
(r

=

=

-.367), absolute error on positive items

.406), overestimation of negative moods (£

=

.446),

depressive bias scores (r =· .347), and with state depression
(r = .351).

The latter correlation between the two measures

of depression is similar to that found in other studies (for
example, Dinning and Evans, 1977 reported the correlation to

-
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Table 4
Trait and State Depression Correlations Across Groups

Measure

Trait

State

1. 000

.351 *

Depression Measures
MMPI Scale 2
Frequency of Negative Affect

. 217

.582

Absolute Error: Positives

-.116

-.148

Absolute Error: Negatives

.406

*

Accuracy Measures

*

.290

Bias Measures
Self-Protective Bias
Underestimation: Negatives
Overestimation: Positives

-.091

-.244

.015

-.032

-.124

-.296 *

*

.347 *

.339

Overestimation: Negatives

.446 *

.347 *

Underestimation: Positives

.142

.211

.189

.285

Shift from Positive Pole

- .126

-.189

Shift from Negative Pole

-.025

-.217

Depression Bias

Behavioral Indices
Performed as Presented

~-

*.E.

<

.05.
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be .4).

For state depression significant correlations were

with overestimation of positive items (£ = -.296), overestimation of negative items (£ = .347), frequency of negative
affect over two weeks (r = .582), and depression bias (r =
.339).

The correlation of state depression with absolute

error on negative items approached significance (£ = .290,
critical value of alpha at .05, two-tailed= .292).
Specific Hypotheses
Three sets of hypotheses were tested: hypotheses about
the relationship between trait depression and affective
memory differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics;
hypotheses about the relationship of state depression to
these differences; and hypotheses relating both kinds of
depression to the behavioral observations of subjects
performing the memory task.

Each hypothesis predicted a

difference between alcoholics and nonalcoholics on a specific
memory production or a behavioral index related to the memory
task.
The data analytic approach used, unless otherwise
noted, was to first demonstrate the hypothesized group
differences by means

of~

tests or ANOVA's.

This was

followed by an ANCOVA analysis to test the significance of
trait depression and state depression as covariates.

Each

form of depression was predicted to act as a mediator of
specific memory differences, with one type of depression
having a significant effect while the other type of depession
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would not.

Despite the prediction of different effects for

the two depression variables, trait depression and state
depression were expected to be moderately correlated.
Therefore, both depression measures were used as covariates
in ANCOVA's in order to evaluate the unique influence of each
type of depression on the dependent variables.

This strategy

addressed an alternative explanation that might be given for
any significant mediation by one form of depression: that the
other form of depression may also, and perhaps better,
account for the observed effect.

Age was also included as a

covariate in the ANCOVA's to control for the significant
group difference in age.

(In no case was age a significant

covariate in these analyses; age is therefore not discussed
further in the discussion of individual hypotheses.)
Finally, correlational analyses were conducted to investigate
the direction and strength of the relationship of each type
of depression to the dependent measures.
Trait Depression Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1. The alcoholic group will have a
significantly higher level of depression than the nonalcoholic group, as measured by Scale 2 of the MMPI.
When a t-test between groups on MMPI Scale 2 scores was
conducted, the groups differed significantly in the predicted
direction, t(42)

=

2.30, £

<

.025, one-tailed.

When age was

entered as a covariate in an analysis of variance, the
resulting statistic for the effect of the covariate was not
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significant.

The statistic for the main effect for groups

was significant, F(l, 42)

=

5.97, £

<

.02.

The hypothesis

was supported.

Hypothesis 2.

Alcoholic subjects will have significant-

ly lover self-protective bias scores than nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly attributable to

trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating
variable.
Statistics resulting from an ANOVA between groups on
self-protective bias scores and from an ANOVA on selfprotective bias scores with age as a covariate were not
significant with alpha set at .05.

Subsequent analyses

controlling for one or both kinds of depression also resulted
in non-significant F-ratios.

The hypothesis was not

supported.
Hypothesis 3.

Alcoholic subjects will have significant-

ly lover absolute accuracy of memory than nonalcoholics after
depression has been controlled.
This hypothesis assumes that trait depression related
biases may obscure differences in cognitive efficiency
between alcoholics and nonalcoholics.

Two measures of

absolute accuracy were used: one for positive mood items and
one for negative mood items.

The difference between groups

on absolute accuracy for positive items was not significant.
Neither age, trait depression, nor state depression had
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significant F-ratios as covariates.

However, trait

depression was found to be significantly correlated at the
.05 level with absolute error on positive items <.r. = .446).
The ANOVA between groups on absolute accuracy on
negative items produced a significant main effect for groups
F(l,42) =6.233, £

.02.

<

Analyses of underestimation and

overestimation of negative moods described under state
depression hypothesis 9 below clarify the source of this
significant group difference as being due primarily to
overestimation of negative moods.

When an ANOVA was

performed controlling for the effects of age, trait
depression and state depression before calculating the group
effect, the main effect for group was no longer significant
F(l, 40) = 1.466, £

<

.3.

Trait depression was the only

significant covariate, F(l, 42) = 5.275, £

<

.03.

Trait

depression correlated significantly at the .05 level with
absolute error on negative items (£ = -.367), as did the
occurrence of negative affect over two weeks (£ = .555).
The hypothesis of group differences in accuracy after
the statistical control of depression was not supported for
either positive or negative mood items.
opposite effect was observed.

In fact, the

Lower accuracy in alcoholics

was found to be significantly attributable to trait
depression differences between groups.

Across groups, trait

depression was found to be significantly correlated with
decreases in accuracy on positive mood items and increases in
accuracy on negative mood items.
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Hypothesis 4.

Alcoholic subjects will have

significantly higher rates of negative affective states on
ESF records than nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will

be significantly attributable to trait depression {measured
by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating variable.

The mean frequency of negative moods was calculated
for each subject.

The alcoholic group mean was 23.29% with a

standard deviation of 13.5%, whereas the nonalcoholic group
mean was 16.84% with a standard deviation of 8.2%.

When an

ANOVA was performed calculating the sums of squares for the
grouping variable before the covariate effects were removed,
the statistic for the main effect for groups closely
approached significance, F{l, 42)

=

~

4.04, E

.052.

The

difference between groups was significant and in the
predicted direction when tested by means of t-tests, t(42)
1.92, E

<

.04, one-tailed.

=

Of three covariates entered in

the ANOVA analysis (age, state depression, and trait
depression) only trait depression significantly explained
variahce in frequency of negative mood occurrence, F(l, 39) =
4.92, E

c~

.04.

When an ANOVA was performed removing the

effects of age, state depression, and trait depression before
calculating the sum of squares for group effects, the group
effect statistic was highly significant, F

=

7 .519, E

<

.01.

Contrary to the prediction of this hypothesis, the control of
trait depression increased between group variance in the
frequency of occurrence of negative mood states.
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Hypothesis 5.

Alcoholic subjects vill have

significantly lower variation in moods on ESF records than
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference vill be significantly

attributable to trait depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI)
as a mediating variable.
The variance of mood item response over two weeks was
calculated for each subject.

The alcoholic group had a mean

variance of 243.69 with a standard deviation of 625.8,
whereas the nonalcoholic group had a mean variance of 918.59
with a standard deviation of 1626.5; the difference between
groups was significant under the one tailed test provided for
in the hypothesis, t(42)

=

1.82,

E

<

.05, one-tailed.

The F

statistic reflected the same level of group effect, F(l,42)
3.121,

E

<

.09.

=

The model no longer demonstrated a trend

toward significance when age, state depression and trait
depression were statistically controlled, F(l, 39) = .962, E
<

.66, NS. However, none of the covariates were significant,

including that of trait depression.

The hypothesis that

lower variation in ESF mood records is significantly
attributable to trait depression was not supported.
Hypothesis 6. Alcoholic subjects vill demonstrate
significantly less sensitivity in their estimates to extremes
of ESF mood-state occurrence than vill nonalcoholic subjects.
This difference will be significantly attributable to trait
depression (measured by Scale 2 MMPI) as a mediating
variable.
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The percent of extreme responses to items on the
self-report scale was calculated for each subject.

All

subject self-ratings that utilized the ''Very" intensity·
marker for any mood state were considered extreme.

Due to

the arrangement of the bipolar scales, the percent of extreme
responses corresponded to the percent of responses using
either the far right-hand or far left-hand Likert scale
marker.
The alcoholic group had a mean percent of extremes of
7.54 with a standard deviation of 9.02, whereas the
nonalcoholic group had a mean of 6.84 with a standard
deviation of 10.6.
significant.

The difference between groups was not

Discrimination scores described earlier were

used as the measure of accuracy.

The alcoholic group had a

mean relative accuracy of .80 with a standard deviation of
.18, whereas the nonalcoholic group had a standard deviation
of .83 with a standard deviation of .15.
conducted using the

~

Analyses were

transformations of these scores.

difference between groups was not significant.

The

The

correlation of extreme responses with accuracy was .2786
across groups (£ = .067).

For the alcoholic subjects alone,

this correlation was .2278, whereas for the nonalcoholic
group alone the correlation was .3405.

Although these group

correlations were in the direction hypothesized, neither the
correlations for individual groups nor the difference between
these correlations approached significance, perhaps due to
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the limit in sample size.

The hypothesized significant group

differences were not supported, therefore the further
hypothesized relationship of such differences to depression
were not analyzed.
To summarize the findings on trait depression
hypotheses: as predicted alcoholics were more depressed than
nonalcoholics.

They did not, however, have significantly

lower self-protective bias scores.

Alcoholics and

nonalcoholic subjects were not significantly different on
absolute accuracy on positive items, with or without
covariates in the analyses.

For absolute accuracy on

negative mood items, alcoholics demonstrated more error, due
to overestimation of negative moods.

Contrary to prediction,

however, this difference between groups was found to be
attributable to trait depression.

As predicted, alcoholics

were found to have significantly higher negative affect on
ESF records and significantly less variability in their ESF
records.

Contrary to prediction, group differences in ESF

negative affect were found to be suppressed by trait
depression.

ESF record variability differences were not

found to be significantly attributable to trait depression.
Finally, alcoholic subjects had lower correlations between
percent of extreme scores and relative accuracy, although not
significantly lower than nonalcoholic subjects.
State Depression Hypotheses
The following hypotheses predict bias related to state
depression, and assume state dependent memory effects.
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Hypothesis 7. The alcoholic group vill have a
significantly higher level of state depression than the
nonalcoholic group, as measured by the DEP scale of the -SCL
90 at the time of the memory task.

The alcoholic group had a mean DEP scale score of .850,
with a standard deviation of .686, whereas the nonalcoholic
group had a mean of .625, with a standard deviation of .631.
Although the means were in the predicted directions, the
differences between groups on SCL 90 DEP scale scores did not
approach significance, and the hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 8.

Alcoholic subjects vill have

significantly higher depressive bias scores than nonalcoholic
subjects.

This difference vill be significantly attributable

to state depression (measured by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a
mediating variable.

The one-tailed test specified in the hypothesis was
significant at the .05 level, t(42)

=

2.32, £ <

.04, with

alcoholics having the higher depressive bias scores.

When an

ANOVA was performed with age, trait depression, and state
depression as covariates, state depression was not a
significant covariate.

As stated earlier, the combined

subjects correlation of state depression and depressive bias
was found to be significant, and in the expected direction (£

=

.339), but smaller than that with trait depression (r

=.347).

The hypothesis of greater depressive bias in

alcoholics was supported.

However, this difference was not
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significantly attributable to state depression.

The second

half of this hypothesis was not supported.
Hypothesis 9.

Alcoholic subjects will be significantly

higher than nonalcoholic subjects in overestimation of
negative moods but will not be significantly different in
overestimation of positive mood items.

This difference will

be significantly attributable to state depression (measured
by the SCL 90 DEP scale) as a mediating variable.
Comparisons by means of t-tests resulted in no
significant differences between groups in overestimation of
positive moods.

ANOVA's controlling for depression and age

resulted in no significant differences between groups on
overestimation of positive items.
Overestimation of negative moods was not significantly
different when tested by means of t-tests.

However, when an

ANOVA was performed on negative mood overestimation computing
the sum of squares for the grouping variable before
controlling for age, trait depression, and state depression,
the main effect for groups was significance given the
one-tailed hypothesis under consideration, F(l, 40) = 2.991,

£

<

.09.

Among the covariates, only trait depression was

significantly related to the overestimation of negative
moods, F(l,41)

= 7.03,

E

<

.02.

Contrary to prediction,

state depression was not a significant covariate.

An ANOVA

on the same variable, but calculating the sum of squares for
the grouping factor after the computation of covariate
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effects, resulted in a much lower F value for groups, F(l,42)

=

.725, £

=

.40, NS.

The hypothesized group difference in

overestimation of negative moods was supported.

This differ-

ence, however, was attributable to trait depression and not
to state depression as had been hypothesized.
To summarize the findings on state depression
hypotheses: alcoholics did not have significantly higher
levels of state depression than nonalcoholic subjects.
Alcoholics had significantly higher depressive bias scores,
but this difference was not significantly attributable to
state depression and was more related to trait than state
depression.

The groups were not significantly different in

overestimates of positive items.

Although the groups were

significantly different in overestimation of negative items;
the difference was significantly explained by trait depression and not by state depression as predicted.
Strategic Processing Hypotheses
This set of hypotheses assumed that order of sub-item
performance on the memory task was a behavioral index of the
degree and type of cognitive strategy used by the subjects.
Hypothesis 10. Alcoholic subjects vill demonstrate
significantly less strategic processing of items in the
behavioral observations of their memory tasks than will nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait and state depression as mediating
variables.
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Two variables were used to assess this hypothesis: the
number of items performed in the identical sub-item order
presented on the memory task form, and the total number Of
items where the sub-item presented last on the memory task
form was performed first.

Descriptive statistics and

significant differences between groups for these variables
and other behavioral indeces of strategic processing appear
in Table 5.

On the number of items performed as presented,

the alcoholic group had a mean of 5.41 and a standard
deviation of 3.12, whereas the nonalcoholic group had a mean
of 3.45 and a standard deviation of 1.97.

The difference

between groups was significant, t(42) = 2.42, £
one-tailed.

<

.001,

An ANOVA on identically performed items with

age, state and trait depression as covariates indicated that
no covariates were significantly related to this variable.
The number of identically performed items was
significantly

correlated at the .05 level with absolute

error on positive items (r = -.438), overestimation of
positive items (£ = .475), and self-protective bias (£ =
-.347).

Although neither correlation was significant, the

correlation of this variable with trait depression was lower
than its correlation with state depression (r = -.189
compared to£= -.285).
On the number of items where the presented pole was
substituted for the opposite· pole, the alcoholic group had a
mean of .818 and a standard deviation of 1.26, whereas the
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Table 5
Behavioral Indices of Strategic Processing

Behavioral Index

Group
Alcoholic
(N

=

M

Performed as Presented

Nonalcoholic

22)

(N

SD

M

=

2 2)
SD

5.4 ( 3. 2)

3.5 (2.0) *

Performed with Poles Switched

.8 ( 1. 3)

2.2 ( 1. 7) *

Shift from Positive Pole

. 3 ( . 5)

1. 2 ( 1. 1 )

Shift from Negative Pole

.5 ( 1. 0)

1. 1 ( 1. 2)

Note.

Units are number of bipolar items.

Note.

*E

<

.005.

*
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nonalcoholic group had a mean of 2.227, and a standard
deviation of 1.72, a difference that was also significant in
the predicted direction,

~(42)

= 3.11,

E

.002, one-tailed.

<

An ANOVA on the number of items with switched first and
third presented sub-items indicated a trend of trait
depression to significantly explain the variance, F(l,40)
3.968, E

.06.

<

=

The F value of variance due to groups was

smaller when the covariates were computed before the group
effects, F(l,42)
12.733, E

<

=

11.750, E

.002.

<

.002 compared with F(l, 39)

=

The hypothesized group differences in

strategic processing were supported.

While there was weak

evidence that depression was related to strategic processing,
the group differences in strategic processing could not be
attributed entirely to depression.
Hypothesis 11.

Across groups, the first sub-item

judgment performed will be significantly different in
accuracy than subsequent sub-item judgments.
The sums of absolute error of estimates across items
for first sub-item performed, second sub-item performed and
third sub-item performed were calculated.

Means and standard

deviations of these variables and other measures of accuracy
and bias by order of sub-item performance appear in Table 6.
No significant group differences occurred on these variables,
although the means were in the predicted direction.
A repeated measures ANOVA was performed across groups
on absolute accuracy by order of sub-item performance.

The
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Table 6
Accuracy and Bias by Order of Sub-item Performance

Group

Measure by Performance Order
Alcoholic
(N
M

=

Nonalcoholic

22)

(N

SD

M

=

2 2)

SD

First

85.3 (58.2)

82.2 (52.2)

Second

54.4 (42.9)

47 .4 (31.4)

Third

58.3 (42.1)

75.0 (66.7)

First

57.4 (42.9)

49.3 (31.4)

Second

70.0 (35.4)

96. 1 ( 64. 7)

Third

58.3 (33.4)

51.0 (33.4)

Underestimation

Note.

All units of measure are percent in error.
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effect for the repeated measure did not approach significance.

However, the univariate F test comparing the

third choice with the other two choices approached significance, F(l,43)

=

3.442, £

<

.08.

Subsequent t-tests

indicated a trend toward the first choice being significantly
more inaccurate than the third choice, t(43)
.09.

=

1.79, £

The hypothesis as stated was not supported.

<

However,

trends were found for differences in accuracy by order of
performance.
Hypothesis 12.

When overestimation and underestimation

are considered by order of sub-item judgment, the first
sub-item judgment will demonstrate significantly less underestimation and significantly more overestimation than other
sub-item judgments.
Overestimation and underestimation sums by order of
sub-item performance were calculated for each subject.

The

resulting means and standard deviations by group appear in
Table 6.
variables.

No significant group differences occurred on these
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on

overestimation by performance order by group was conducted.
No multivariate main effects or interaction effects approached significance. The univariate F-test for overestimation
n the second sub-item performed compared with the other two
sub-items across groups was significant, F(2, 40)
£

<

= 3.6928,

.04, with overestimation on the second sub-item being

lower than that on other sub-items.
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A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on underestimation by performance order by group.

The interaction

of group by performance order approached significance, Hotellings F approximation: F(2, 39)

=

2.5143, £

<

.01, with

the alcoholic group underestimating less on the second subi tem performed.
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on underestimation by performance order by group. The interaction of
group by performance order approached significance, Hotellings F(2, 39) = 2.5143, £

<

.01, with the alcoholic group

underestimating less on the second sub-item performed.
The hypothesis as stated was not supported.

However,

evidence was found for differences in overestimation by order
of performance, and for a group by performance order interaction on underestimation.
Hypothesis 13.

Nonalcoholic subjects will demonstrate

significantly higher use of positive -mood states as the first
sub-item performed in behavioral observations of their memory
tasks.

This difference will be significantly attributable to

trait and state depression as mediating variables.
The number of items on which subjects performed the
positive sub-item first although the negative sub-item was
presented initially on the memory task form was used as the
dependent variable.

Alcoholic subjects had a mean of .5

shifts to positive sub-items with a standard deviation of
.964, whereas nonalcoholic subjects had a mean of 1.05 with a
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standard deviation of 1.21; the difference between groups was
not significant.

The hypothesis was not supported.

Although the number of shifts to positive poles was not
different between the two groups, several interesting
significant correlations of this variable with other
variables emerged.

The number of shifts to positive poles

significantly correlated at the .05 level with the frequency
of positive affect over two weeks (£ = .412), the frequency
of negative affect over two weeks (£ = -.332), the number of
shifts to a negative pole (£ = .312), absolute error on the
second sub-item performed (£ = -.338), absolute error on the
third sub-item performed (r = -.376), and underestimation of
the first sub-item performed(£= -.293).
Due to the asymmetrical of positive and negative
effects of mood on memory, it was not hypothesized that
alcoholics subjects would have higher use of negative moods
as the first sub-item performed.

When the number of items on

which a subject did not perform the presented positive pole,
but instead performed the negative pole first was
investigated, however, unexpected group differences emerged.
The alcoholic group mean was .3182, with a standard deviation
of .48, whereas the nonalcoholic group mean was 1.182, with a
standard deviation of .1.21.

The difference between groups

was significant, F(l, 42) =12.733, E

<

.0002, one-tailed,

after removal of the effects of age and both types of
depression in an ANOVA.

Only age was significantly related

- 106

to shifting to
.04.

negative sub-items, F (1, 39) = 4,623, E

<

This variable had significant correlations at the .05

level with only the sum of absolute error on the first
sub-item chosen(£= -.335).
Hypothesis 14.

Alcoholic subjects will demonstrate

strategic processing biases as stated in hypothesis 13 to a
significantly lesser degree, but in the same direction as
nonalcoholic subjects.

This difference will be significantly

attributable to trait and state depression as mediating
variables.

When groups are compared on the tendency to shift
sub-item poles, more shifts of both types took place in the
nonalcoholic group, as described above.

Across groups the

difference between negative shifts and positive shifts was
small and nonsignificant, t

(43) = .12, NS.

The nonalcoholic

group had more shifts to negative poles than to positive
poles, and the alcoholic group had more shifts to positive
poles than to negative poles.

Therefore, contrary to the

hypothesis, the dominant type of shift was different for each
group.

As stated under the results for Hypothesis 13, the

significant differences on use of the positive pole and
negative pole were not significantly attributable to
depression.

The hypothesis was not supported.

To summarize the findings on strategic processing:
nonalcoholic subjects demonstrated significantly more
strategic processing than alcoholics, as predicted.

Some
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significant correlations were found between strategic
processing variables and depression variables.

However,

contrary to the assumptions of these hypotheses, group
differences in strategic processing were not significantly
attributable to depression.

Some evidence supported the

assumption that order of sub-item performance was related to
accuracy in general and specifically to underestimation of
the first sub-item performed.

Nonalcoholic subjects

demonstrated significantly more shifts to both negative
sub-items and to positive sub-items than did alcoholic
subjects, although only the higher number of shifts to
positive sub-items was predicted.

Contrary to prediction,

the type of shift made did not vary with either the kind of
depression or with group membership.

CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION
The Effects of State and Trait Depression
on Affective Memory
Understanding the relationship between the two measures
of depression used in the present study is key in understanding the results for all three sets of hypotheses.

As

was expected, the correlation between the two measures was
positive, moderate in magnitude (r

=

correlations found in other studies.

.351), and comparable to
However, several of the

hypotheses tested assumed different and opposing effects on
memory of trait and state depression.
assumed to cause

Trait depression was

decreased self-protective bias due to

depressive realism, increased inaccuracy of memory related to
cognitive inefficiency, and decreased strategic processing
related to depression-related declines in initiative, motivation, and capacity.

State depression was assumed to cause

increased depressogenic bias and to guide the direction of
strategic processing by decreasing the use of the positive
pole as the first item performed among sub-items.
In the case of hypotheses based on these assumptions
about state depression, significant effects, when observed,
were found to be stronger for the trait measure than for the
108
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state measure, suggesting that the two kinds of depression at
times have similar, not opposing effects, and that the two
measures could be considered measures of the same construct,
with the MMPI Scale 2 being the more sensitive, or reliable
measure.
The finding of low levels of state depression in both
groups also challenges the assumption that two separate
depressive processes were influencing memory in the present
study.

From the conceptualization of diagnostic severity and

current mood introduced earlier, one would expect individuals
who were trait depressed to also be more likely to be in a
depressed mood at the time of the memory task.

Thus it was

predicted that the alcoholic group and the nonalcoholic group
would differ in levels of both kinds of depression.

However,

the level of state depression in both groups was surprisingly
low.

Even in the alcoholic group, which had 8 individuals

with clinical levels of trait depression, only 3 persons were
.

state depressed by the less stringent non-patient norms.
Perhaps stronger effects for state depression would have been
observed in samples with higher levels of state depression,
or larger samples with a greater range of state depression.
Several possibilities exist to account for for this low
level of state depression.

It could be argued that the SCL

90 is not a sensitive measure of state depression, since it
is a measure of general distress over two weeks, and not a
measure of a specific affect at the moment of testing.

Also
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it is possible the administration of the memory task at the
end of two weeks of beeper carrying and self-reporting,
accompanied by the attention given to the subject's
experiences by the experimenters served as a positive mood
induction that influenced the entire experimental situation,
including memory estimates, SCL 90 scores, and strategic
processing of sub-items (both the SCL 90 and the Memory Task
were performed in the presence of the experimenters).

The

SCL 90 and other self-report measures of depression have been
shown to be highly correlated with measures of social
desirability response sets (Tanaka-Matsumi & Kameoka, 1986).
Some evidence for two separate depressive processes
related to memory was garnered from the data, despite the low
level of state depression.

Two exceptions to the general-

ization that trait depression effects are stronger than
and parallel to state depression effects were found in
the present study; both were consistent with the assumption
of two separate depression processes.

The first exception

was that state depression was more strongly related to
strategic processing than was trait depression.

The second

exception was found among correlations between the depression
measures and the components of depression bias scores and
self-protective bias scores.

Whenever the correlations were

of any interpretable magnitude, the two types of depression
had relationships in the same direction,

but the type of

depression with the higher correlation varied among the
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measures.

Although it is possible to attribute these

differences to sampling error, they are consistent with
theories premising two separated depressive processes. ·
(These exceptions will be discussed in more detail later and
are cited here only as partial evidence of separate depressive processes).
Given the caveats concerning the state depression
measure and the low levels of state depression observed, the
one significant effect for state depression different for
that of trait depression and several situations where state
depression had stronger, albeit nonsignificant, correlations
with relevant variables are viewed here as fairly persuasive
evidence for two separate depressive processes.

Therefore,

the effects of each type of depression on memory and cognitive strategy will be discussed separately before an
attempt will be made to understand their combined effects.
In the present study, the effects of trait depression
on memory were assumed to be stronger than those for state
depression, and more hypotheses related to trait depression
were tested.

To briefly review the results related to these

hypotheses, as predicted, the groups differed significantly
in the level of trait depression.

However, not all of the

differences found between groups on negative affect measures,
record variability measures, and memory were related to trait
depression.

Memory accuracy for negative and positive moods

was related differently to trait depression, which increased
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accuracy on positive moods and decreased accuracy on negative
moods.

When depression was controlled, negative affect

differences were more pronounced between alcoholic and .
nonalcoholic subjects.

Memory estimates by alcoholics were

less sensitive to extremes of mood state occurrences,
although they had experienced a higher percent of extreme
responses.
These results suggest that trait depression is related
to negative affective experience, but that alcoholics when
compared to nonalcoholics experience significantly more
additional negative affect that is unrelated to depression.
Trait depression is related to reduced variability in
emotional experiences, as well as to increased emotional
extremes; these extremes subsequently have less of a
distorting impact on memory in trait depressed alcoholic
subjects than is the case with the less depressed nonalcoholic subjects.

The later finding is consistent with

the depressive realism prediction that alcoholics, being more
depressed, will recall experiences (especially negative
experiences) with less self-protective bias than controls.
Despite the significant effects of depression related
to differences between the alcoholic and nonalcoholic groups,
controls were not found to have significantly higher selfprotecti ve bias scores, as would have been consistent with
the depressive realism view that nondepressed persons distort
memories in order to protect themselves, whereas depressed
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alcoholics do not.

A cognitive deficit view also does not

account for the findings, since accuracy varied by item type,
with the two groups being significantly different only on
items with negative content.

The findings on trait depres-

sion are more consistent with the view that alcoholics
have a depressogenic bias: alcoholics overestimate negative
events more and ·overestimate positive events less than do
nonalcoholic subjects.

Note that this pattern remains even

when the frequency of negative mood state occurrence is
statistically controlled.
On the other hand, contrary to predictions following
from the assumption of depressogenic cognitive schema in
alcoholics, the alcoholics underestimate negative mood items
more than nonalcoholic subjects.

The fact that the two

groups report negative affective memories with different
degrees of accuracy, with the alcoholic group both overestimating and underestimating negative affects more than
nonalcoholics is consistent with a

psychodynamic interpre-

tation that the alcoholic subjects have powerful defenses
against negative affect which involve alternately avoiding
and immersing themselves in negative affects, especially
depression (Khantzian, 1980).
Full investigation of this possibility would involve
item by item analysis of the data to find which items were
contribµting most to these differences, with apriori hypotheses made about each item in regard its relevance to
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the various spheres of conflict typical of alcoholics.
Such an investigation would also have to take into
consideration that the alcoholics treated in an Alcoholics
Anonymous oriented facility (as was the case with those in
the present study) are engaged in daily ideological training
related to the relative value and dangers of mood states and
the importance of the "owning" of various negative emotions.
If such training is effective, a new basis of self-esteem
based on perceiving one's self as either consistent or
inconsistent with the treatment ideology may influence
emotional experience, self-reports of that experience, and
ultimately may influence memory estimates.

In essence, an

artificial source of cognitive bias related to affect and
affective memories, an artificial defense, may be provided by
Alcoholics Anonymous

oriented treatment to alcoholic

subjects and not to the nonalcoholic subjects.

Additional

conflict about negative moods might be created by such
.

treatment if the new treatment related cognitive biases are
not compatible with the alcoholic's previous cognitive
predispositions.
Beyond the effects of indoctrination and attitude
change, such treatment may alsq involve increased rehearsal
of various moods, both covertly' and overtly.

Lynn Hasher

(personal communication, November, 1986) has suggested the
group differences in accuracy by emotional content.found in
the preliminary study might be due to different levels of
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memory rehearsal between groups Such rehearsal could be
generated by affective processes, naturally occurring
cognitive structures, or the directed rehearsal provided· in
A.A. group activities.

Clearly, however, confirming or

refuting these speculations remains beyond the scope of the
present study.
Little remains to be discussed about the effects of
state depression as independent of trait depression.
Although the two groups did not differ significantly in the
level of state depression, evidence was found to support the
existence of increased depressive bias in alcoholics, with
this bias consisting primarily in the overestimation of
negative emotional events.

Depressive bias differences were

not significantly attributable to state depression, but
across groups depressive bias was significantly correlated
with both forms of depression, with this relationship being
stronger for trait depression than state depression.

These

findings appear to be consistent with Beck's view of a
depressogenic cognitive stance wherein cognitive structures
influence perceptions, affects, and memories, which in turn
interactively influence mood predispositions.

The obser-

vation of depressive bias in alcoholics in the absence
of high levels of state depression favors Beck's cognitive
schema view, which provides the mediation of memory bias by a
depressogenic cognitive structure that is not dependent on
current depressed affect.

These findings do not support
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Bower's original formulation of mood selectivity theory,
however, which states that it is the current mood, not
longstanding cognitive or affective predispositions, that
influences availability of mood relevant memories.
The present study's procedures and hypotheses have
assumed that it is the combined effects of state and trait
depression that accounts for accuracy and bias differences
between alcoholics and nonalcoholic subjects.

As mentioned

earlier, the exceptions to the general rule of trait
depression having a stronger influence on accuracy and bias
than state depression are an important place to begin
formulating what those combined effects might be.

When the

correlations of state and trait depression with the components of self-protective bias and depressive bias are
examined, a plausible model for the combined effects of two
separate depressive processes can be constructed based on
their selective impacts on positive and negative affective
memories.

Increases in state depression were significantly

related to decreases in overestimation of positive items,
whereas the relationship of this variable with trait
depression was not significant.

The correlation of under-

estimation of positive moods with state depression was
higher than that of trait depression with this measure.

Both

types of depression had negligible correlations with the
underestimation of negative moods.

Both types of depression

had significant positive correlations with the overestimation
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of negative moods, with that with trait depression being
appreciably higher.
These correlations may be the result of two depressive
processes, which can be distinguished from each other by
their different magnitudes of impact on positive and negative
affective memories.

In turn, these different impacts on

affective memories can be viewed as related to selfprotective bias and depressive bias.

State depression

may be the primary source of self protective bias deficits
which it causes by inhibiting an otherwise dominant trend
toward maximizing positive events in memory.

Trait

depression may be the primary source of increased depressive
bias by maximizing negative events in memory, perhaps in part
via increased covert rehearsal of negative moods.
This view combines Alloy and Abramson's (1981) construct of the absence of self-protective bias in depressives
with the depressogenic bias of Beck (1974) and other cognitive
theorists.

The fact that in the present study, state depres-

sion correlated with positive memory content more than did
trait depression is also consistent with reports in the literature of asymmetrical mood selectivity effects, that is
that congruity of mood and stimuli increases recall and
retrieval for positive stimuli, but the same effect is less
powerful for negative mood and negative stimuli (Isen,
Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978).

Asymmetry of mood enhances

integrative theories such as Johnson and Magraro's (1987).
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Strategic Processing, Memory, and Affect
The order of sub-item performance and accuracy by
sub-item performance were used in the present study as
behavioral indices of cognitive strategies involving both
affective and cognitive components.

Weighing the relative

strengths and directions among hypothetical affective and
cognitive processes to predict outcomes on a previously
unexplored behavioral measure is clearly a risky endeavor.
Nevertheless, significant differences between groups on these
behavioral indices were found, accompanied by significant
relationships with cognitive and affective measures.
Unfortunately, the significant relationships among these sets
of variables were not consistently those predicted.
As predicted, significant relationships were found between behavioral measures of cognitive strategy and measures
of cognitive output: accuracy and bias measures.

Due to

differences in strategic processing, the two groups had
eifferent typical outcomes on the first sub-item performed.
For the alcoholic group, the first sub-item performed was
most likely to be the first sub-item presented on the memory
task form, and to be less accurate than the two subsequent
sub-item judgments.

For the nonalcoholic group, the first

sub-item performed was not likely to be the one presented on
the memory form, and was not likely to be the most inaccurate
of the three sub-item judgments.

For both groups the first

sub-item performed was on the average the most overestimated
among the three sub-items.

Jl9
Evidence was provided for the assumption that accuracy
and bias were related to the order of sub-item performance.
As strategic processing increased (as measured by the number
of sub-items performed in an order other than that presented
on the memory task form), self-protective bias scores
increased significantly, as did accuracy on positive mood
items.

The number of shifts to negative sub-items was

significantly correlated with increased accuracy on the first
sub-item performed.

The number of shifts to positive items

was significantly correlated with less underestimation of the
first sub-item performed, and with reduced error on subsequent sub-items.

Taken together these findings suggest

that increased strategic processing as defined in the present
study is related to increased accuracy and increased selfprotecti ve bias.
The nonalcoholic group made significantli more shifts
to both positive and negative mood poles than did the
alcoholic group.

Contrary to earlier predictions, this

significant difference between alcoholic and nonalcoholic
subjects in strategic processing was not significantly
attributable to depression.

However, the negative

correlation of state depression with items performed as
presented approached significance.

This suggests that the

moderate levels of state depression observed in the present
study may increase strategic processing, whereas (again
contrary to the prediction made in the present study) trait
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depression has less impact on strategic processing of this
kind of task.
Stronger evidence linked the use of strategic
processing to affect generally, rather than to specific
measures of depression.

Strategic processing was found to

increase significantly with positive affect over the two week
recording interval.

The number of shifts to positive poles

increased significantly with the frequency of positive affect
over two weeks and decreased significantly with the frequency
of negative affect over two weeks.

Given these significant

relationships of strategic processing variables with
occurrences of affect in ways consistent with a process that
would be expected to decrease with depression, it is
surprising that no significant relationship with depression
was detected, and that the relationship that approached
significance suggested an increase in strategic processing
with an increase in state depression.
Several explanations of these findings may be advanced.
A simple explanation of the failure to find significant
relationships between strategic processing and depression is
that the absence of the expected relationship is an artifact
of the depression measures.

Specifically, the limitations of

the state depression measure and the unexpectedly restricted
range in state depression described previously may have
obscured the relationship between state depression and
strategic processing.

A similar argument to account for the
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failure to find a relationship between trait depression and
strategic processing is less convincing, however, since high
levels of trait depression and significant differences in
trait depression scores were found between alcoholics and
nonalcoholics.
Perhaps, as was assumed in the hypotheses of this
study, the amount and direction of strategic processing are
controlled by different kinds of depression.

Trait

depression may determine the amount of strategic processing,
while state depression may determine the choice of either the
positive or negative mood pole when it does occur.

This

would explain the higher strategic processing by nonalcoholic
subjects, who had significantly lower trait depression, and
the absence of any clear difference in the direction of
processing either within or between the groups, due to the
low level of state depression in both groups.

However, two

facts argue powerfully against this interpretation: the
differences observed between groups were not significantly
attributable to depression, and the trait depression measure
(on which the groups were significantly different) was only
weakly correlated with the amount of strategic processing.
Another possibility is also consistent with the
assumption of two separate depressive processes which may
interact.

Trait depression may inhibit strategic processing,

whereas state depression may increase it.

In such a

scenario, individuals with low trait depression and moderate

-3.. 2 2

state depression would be most likely to exhibit strategic
processing.

These individuals would most likely occur in the

control group, which had significantly lower trait depression
and roughly equivalent state depression when compared to the
alcoholic group.

A similar explanation involves interactions

between levels of depression rather than interactions between
types of depression, and is based on the hypothesis that the
relationship between any form of depression and strategic
processing is not linear.

For example, high levels of

depression may inhibit strategic processing, moderate levels
may motivate increased strategic processing, and low levels
may not provide the requisite motivation.
To the extent that the difference between groups in
strategic processing may be attributed to some depressive
process, or interaction of depressive processes, the relative
paucity of strategic processing in alcoholic subjects appears
to argue against both the earlier proposed psychodynamic view
of defensive responding in alcoholics and Beck's depressogenic world view theory (Beck, 1976), but is consistent
with Schwartz's interpretation of depressive realism as
related to the absence of cognitive strategies and the general
failure of the defenses in depression (Schwartz, 1981a;
198lb).
Personality traits other than the predisposition toward
depression are also probably reflected in the strategic
processing measures.

Subjects were told they may perform
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sub-items however they may choose, but were not otherwise
encouraged to develop any strategy.

Passivity, compliance,

and oppositionality are traits that may be relevant in such a
context, as well as creativity and field dependence/
independence.
Explanations of these group differences based on
factors other than personality may be more convincing.
Perhaps cognitive capacity differences between groups is a
relevant factor in determining strategic processing differences.

The fact that the groups have roughly equivalent

memory accuracy performances when item content is not considered makes this interpretation less plausible upon first
examination.

However, memory for frequency of occurrences

is conceptualized as a low capacity demand cognitive
function, has been typified as automatic, or effortless.
The memory task is a test of incidental learning.

Cognitive

functions other than incidental learning and are involved in
the strategic processing measures.

The strategic processing

of a cognitive task is conceptualized as a relatively effortful, high capacity demand cognitive function, requiring more
mental faculties, and involving intention, initiative, and
probably the absence of apathy toward the task.

The

alcoholics might have been less motivated to perform the task
creatively, or less apt to use available cognitive strategies
while maintaining the ability to do so.

This passive, less

initiating tendency is strikingly similar in some ways

J24
to what one might expect from depressed subjects, but may
have sources other than depression in alcoholic subjects.
These other sources may also account for the significant
relationship between gender and strategic processing, such
that males performed significantly more items as presented,
as did alcoholic subjects.

Since male alcoholics typically

have more severe courses than female alcoholics, according to
some researchers, the observed differences in strategic
processing may be related to a severity factor that reduces
effortful processing, or the spontaneous initiation of
effortful processes.
Limitations of the Present Study
The present study would have been improved considerably
by increasing the number of subjects in each group, providing
multiple measures of both trait and state depression, and
measuring the severity of both cognitive deficits and
alcoholism symptoms.
how it is

In addition, the concept of bias and

measured might have been refined.

Several caveats have already been advanced about the
use of the SCL 90 as a measure of state depression, and the
possibility that a positive mood induction was unintentionally included in the administration of the memory task
and state depression measure.

The SCL 90 has been used

for this purpose in other studies, and despite its limitations, it nonetheless remains appropriate in studies involving
clinical subjects.

Although depression was operationally
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measured in two ways (the SCL 90 DEP and the MMPI Scale 2)
two separate constructs were assumed.

A separate measure of

state depression specific to the moment that the memory· task
was performed would have been a valuable addition to this
experiment, which for other constructs (accuracy, bias,
strategic processing) utilized more than one operational
measure.
A ESF self-report of mood at the time of memory task
performance might have provided a suitable second measure of
state depression.

This would have provided both a second

measure of state depression, and a means to investigate the
possibility that the experimental procedures themselves
contained a mood induction.

ESF reports for subjects could

be obtained after systematically controlling for the presence
or absence of two weeks of self reporting, interviews, and
memory task.

Following the same logic for a second measure

of trait depression, perhaps the BDI or other trait measure
could have been used for a second measure of this construct.
The use of relatively small numbers of subjects in each
group is both a strength and a weakness of the present study.
Significant differences and correlations were found even with
these modest samples; the use of larger samples might have
made less ambiguous those situations in which one-tailed
tests were required to reach significance, or where
statistical tests approached significance.
Ideally, the present study would include a measure of
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cognitive efficiency separate from the memory accuracy and
bias measures related to ESF records.

Scores from subtest of

the WAIS-R or other relevant tests sensitive to cognitive
deficits might have been used.

The Wechsler Memory Scale

paired associated learning subtest might have provided a
measure of affectively neutral verbal memory and learning.
Such measures could be used to investigate the possibility
that cognitive efficiency or capacity differences mediated
some of the differences between groups that are not attributable to depression.
Related to the criticism that no external measure of
cognitive efficiency or capacity was used in the present
study is the criticism that a severity measure for alcoholic
course would be needed to understand any between group
differences that might emerge on any of the other measures.
It is notoriously difficult to equate courses and severity of
alcohol abuse, weighing years of use, periods of abstinence
or unproblematic use, binge using, dose per episode, average
intake per interval of use, and the presence and frequency of
pathognomic symptoms such as hallucinations, black outs, and
physical complications.

The alcoholics in the present study

were equated only by their recent treatment.

This implies

only a degree of alcohol related symptoms severe enough to
result in treatment, and the existence of a period of
recuperation, abstinence, and recovery deemed sufficient
enough by the treatment facility to merit discharge.

Clearly
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both depression and cognitive deficits may be related to
severity of use, and a measure of what probably was a wide
range in severity of alcoholism would have been useful in
investigating these relationships.
Finally, the concept of bias is limited in the present
study.

Bias in regard to affective memory may exist in at

least three forms.

Bias may exist not only in the degree of

overestimation or underestimation, as was the emphasis in the
present study, but also bias may be reflected in the tendency
to overestimate or underestimate generally.

It may also be

reflected in both more overestimation and more underestimation on the same category of mood item, as was the
case with alcoholics in the present study who overestimated
and underestimated negative moods more often than controls,
yet had higher correlations of their estimates of negative
moods with their reported negative moods, thus suggesting
that the greater error was not simply inaccuracy, but bias.
As suggested earlier item by item analysis of this third type
of bias is required.

Any of the three forms of bias

discussed here may be mediated by depression or other
affective factors.
Conclusions and Implications for Future Research
The present study made several methodological
contributions to the understanding affect and cognition in
alcoholics.

~y

using both state and trait measures of

depression and clinical subjects, it provided an example

~f
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operationalizing recent theoretical formulations about the
effects of current mood and affective psychopathology on
memory.

To the author's knowledge, it is the first study to

introduce both state and trait depression measures in
research on memory biases related to depression.

This is

also the first study to use the ESM to investigate memory for
rate of mood state occurrence.

Another methodological

contribution was the development of behavioral indices of
cognitive processes.

Based on order of item choice, these

behavioral measures consistently resulted in significant
differences between alcoholics and nonalcoholics, suggesting
that such indices may be useful for investigating variables
related to alcoholism other than depression.
The present study's findings lend support to Beck's
(1976) theory of depressive biases in the cognitive
functioning of depressives, specifically for affective memory
functioning.

It was demonstrated that depression is

significantly related to the tendency to make more error on
items with negative emotional content than on other items,
with the additional error primarily being due to the
overestimation of rates of reported negative mood states.
This finding, among others in the present study, adds to the
growing body of research that points to an asymmetry of the
selectivity effects of mood on memories for positive versus
negative content (Isen, et al., 1978).
The present study suggests several directions for
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future research.

Research using the ESM is growing, but the

use of that method to investigate memory for frequency of
mood occurrence is unique to the present study.

It is hoped

that other studies will be conducted investigating memory for
mood in a wide range of clinical and nonclinical populations.
The role of affective predispositions, current affect, and
cognitive structures relevant to affect would remain
variables of interest in such studies regardless of the
population under investigation.
The critique above provides more specific
for future research.

directions

A study similar to the present study

could be conducted, but with a larger number of subjects,
added depression measures, external measures of cognitive
efficiency, a severity index for alcoholism, and an improved
approach to bias.
Studies of memory bias before and after in vivo
ingestion of alcohol might be incorporated in a programmatic
investigation of some of the issues raised in the present
study.

Intentional mood induction before the memory task

could also be used to investigate the relationship between
state and trait depression in alcoholics and normals, with
induction of various moods combined with alcohol ingestion in
some trials to investigate the effects of alcohol on memory
accuracy and bias under varying conditions of current mood.
Memory for affects in controlled stimuli other than the self
might also be investigated under the same conditions, such as
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memory for the affect expressed by characters in a brief
story or film.
The attempt to track cognitive strategies by means of
measures formed from simple behavioral observations could
produce several fruitful lines of research.

Depression did

not account for most of the observed differences between
groups, leaving much room for personality and cognitive
variables to be investigated.

Perhaps the simple method of

observing order of performance of a limited range of choices
could be used effectively for investigating functions other
than memory.

These functions might include those related to

decision making and problem solving: for example, information
collection, abstraction, and the way people divide whole
tasks into smaller parts.
In general, any research conducted with the goal of
delineating further the role of various affective processes
on memory in alcoholics, that may not be symmetrical for
nonalcoholics would be a useful contribution to following up
on some of the findings in the present study, and clarifying
some of the many issues it leaves unresolved.

Although the

scope of such studies might be more focused than that of the
present study, and more tied to a specific theoretical perspective, it is hoped that this attempt to combine affective,
cognitive, and behavioral aspects of a clinically relevant
situation will serve as encouragement to other researchers to
also avoid isolating these aspects in future studies.
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MEMORY TASK INSTRUCTIONS
NOTE: Use this answer sheet and a blank booklet to get the person oriented
to the task.
KEY POINTS:
1. Want to get the subject to
booklet, not how they felt
may use their recollection
to how they filled out the

think about how he/she filled out the
then or now about the items. Many subjects
of feelings to "jog" their memories as
book.

2. These responses are in terms of percentages of 100%.

3. After you explain the task, see if they can tell you what they are
going to be doing.
4. "General Explanation": We are trying to understand how people
remember and what ways people may or may not use to remember things.
What we'd like you to do is help us in the memory test. There are
no right or wrong answers. All we will ask you to do is remember
some aspects of what you have been doing in regards to the patient
workbook.
We are going to concentrate on trying to find out how you filled
out ("marked") the book; not how you were feeling. This memory
task is only related to how you filled out the qustions.
5. Under the heading of General Questions:
The first two (#1 and #2) refer to a special dimension of memory.
All these questions are getting at is how often the mark was to
the right or left of the page.
Question #2 and #3 are related to the positive and/or negative
dimension of the item. This is the emotional/feeling aspect of
the task.
Help the subjects understand these two related, but by very
distinct tasks. Repeat it or have them repeat it before they do
the task. You can ref er to the mood rating scale on the page
itself or to the unanswered page in the booklet.
6. When the subject actually gets to the mood items that are scaled
like the booklet, make it clear that the
(brackets)
over the various responses are calling for a summary of those marks.
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The total repsonse should equal 100%. They can answer the questions
any way they choose (e.g., figuring out% positive, then neutral,
and then negative or whatever sequence they choose).
7. The final four questions ask for two ratings that cut across these
dimensions. Again, these are summaries of their marks and the total
has to equal 100%.
Refer to the blank booklet to orient subject, if necessary.
8. Some subjects, when given the instructions, will feel it is impossible
to do. Encourage them, provide extra time, suggest that whatever
they can do will be helpful.
If subject persists, then excuse him/her from the task.
SCHEDULE OF SUBJECTS
1.

Presently Active Subjects
Gp I

Book 6

Overall Assessment

Gp II
2.

3.

Overall Assessment

New Subjects as of 5/21/84
Gp I

Book 1

Book 6

Overall Assessment

Gp II

Book 1

x

Overall Assessment

Community Sample
Book 1

These forms will be located in a folder in Lil's desk (marked "Memory
Study") and will be in the appropriate folders when subjects return.
A red dot will remind you that the task needs to be done on a given
subject.

WJF/gj
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Table B-1
Mean

Fregue~cy

by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Positives

Nonalcoholic

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud

.

CheerfuL
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers

Happy/Sad
Irritable/Cheerful
Strong/Weak
AngryI Friendly
Active/Passive
LonelyI Sociable
Proud/ .A.shamed
Confused/ Cl ear
Tense/Relaxed

M

SD

M

SD

69.7
64.3
41.0
49.6
33.4
51.1
58.6
50.0
61.5
58.5

23.0
20 .1
30.8
27 .3
28.2
23.6
24.0
22.9
33.3
27.8

't'9. lt

t3". ·r
20.2
23.5
18.6
26.9
18.9
18.6
21.9
21.8
25.6

Nonalcoholic

Alert/Drowsy

Alcoholic

4.5
24.8
27.4
43 .1
30.8
22.5
32.1
62. 7
26.9
19 .1

5.2
18.3
21.5
32.4
23.4
27.7
25.1
31.4
31.5
19.9

63.8
55.2
59.3
49.4
57.2
58.4
52.1
63.6
45.8

Alcoholic

3.0
18. 1
18.8
25.8
20.9
13.4
17.9
37 .1
14.9
12.8

4.6
15.5
12.9
23.4
17.5
13.7
18 .1
27 .5
13.9
19.0

P Level

P Level

*
**

-
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Table B-1 -Continued.

Mean Frequency by Test Item and by Group

Item

Group
Nonalcoholic

Negatives

M
10.6
21.4

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

17.9
11.6
22.3
25.8
11.0
15.9
27.8
3.9

Non-Mood Items

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE: .!!.

= 22

SD
7.4
10. 1
20.3
10.8
17 .1

20.2
9.2
15.5
17.3
5.7

Nonalcoholic

M

SD

5.7
2.6
94.5
14.0

6.5
5.3
8.4
14. 7

for all group means.

* p < .05.
Hp< .01.

Alcoholic

M
20.7
23.9
20.0
21.6
41.4
17.6
18 .1
19.0
27 .3
13.4

SD
14.8
15.5
20.6
15.9
21.7
14 .1
16.9
13.4
18.5
12. 7

Alcoholic

M
7.4
5. 1
88.3
3.3

SD
10.3
9.0
19.5
28.3

P Level

*
**

*
P Level

**
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Table B-2
Mean Estimates by Item and by Group

Item

Group

Positives

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy
Happy/Sad

Nonalcoholic

Al.coholic

M

SD

M

SD

69.2
67.6
48.2
58.5
33.0
62.6
70.6
64.1
71.6
58.1

24.0
31. 2
36.2
32.4
35.0
29.9
29.3
33.09
31.3
33.4

69.7
62.6
54.3
62.1
52.6
59 .1
61.5
53.0
63.9
45.8

25.6
29.8
31.5
27.2
36.2
29.7
28.7
29.4
30.3
33.8

Nonalcoholic

7 .1
22.6
Irritable/Cheerful 22.5
Strong/Weak
38.5
Angry/Friendly
21.0
Active/Passive
22.8
LonelyI Sociable
22.0
Proud/Ashamed
61.8
Confused/Clear
24.2
Tense/Relaxed
20.7

9.8
30.8
28.0
37.4
28.7
33.7
29.8
38.2
29.5
19.8

Alcoholic

17.7
21.2
18. 7
26.7
17 .1
17.3
18.9
34.5
15 .1
41.3

23 .1
28.7
22.7.
33.5
22.9
23.8
29.1
37.4
18. 7
32.0

P Level

P Level

*
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Table B-2 -Continued

Mean Estimates by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Negatives

Angry
Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
J;>rowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

Non-Mood Items

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

Nonalcoholic

M

SD

M

SD

8.5
14.9
13.9
8.4
20.7

7.9
15.5
18.4

23.5
22.2
27 .6
21.0

25.4
25.2
25.0
22.4

41.3
16.3
16 .1
19.0
20.6
12.8

32.0
19.2
18.3
16.3
19 .1
18.5

23.5
9.6
13.4
18. 7
2.5

11.5
19.8
19.6
10.3
14.2
16.9
4.7

Nonalcoholic

M
10.2
2.5
62.1
26.8

SD
16.2
4.5
47.8
26.4

NOTE: .!! = 22 for all group means.

* p < .05.

Alcoholic

Alcoholic

M
20.2
16.8
61.0

SD
30.0
27 .5
41.8

43.1

31.9

l Level

*

*
*
*

•
l Level

*
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Table B-3

Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Item

Group

Positives

Nonalcoholic
M

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy
Happy/Sad
Irritable/Cheerful
Strong/Weak
Angry/Friendly
Active/Passive
Lonely/Sociable
Proud/Ashamed
Confused/Clear
Tense/Relaxed

0.4
3.3
0.72
.0.9
0.3
11.6
12 .1
4.2·
0 .1
·0.4

SD

16.5
22.7
24.7
19 .6
20.7
18.6
21.8
23.5
22.1
19.6

Nonalcoholic

2.6
2.2
4.9
4.6
9.8
0.3
10.1
0.9
2.7
2.1

9.4
23.7
17.3
23.6
19.8
14.2
19.6
26.8
22.0
24.7

Alcoholic
M

9.7
1.2
1.2
·2.8
3.2
1.9
3.0
0.9
0.3

o.o

SD

21.0
18.6
18.6
19.9
17.7
18.6
18.2
20.8
17 .1
17.7

Alcoholic

14.6
.3.2
0 .1
0.9
3.7
3.8
1.0
2.6
-0 .3
·O .1

! Level

21.8
19.5
17.6
17.5
14.8
16.3
23.7
20.8
12.7
13.6

P Level
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Table B-3 -Continued.

Signed Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Group

Item
Nonalcoholic

Negatives

Alcoholic

M

M

SD

Angry

2.1

6.7

~- 7

SD
20.0

Irritable

6.6

12.9

1. 7

20.1

Lonely
Confused

4.0

13.6
11.8

2.3
0.6

14.6

Tense
Drowsy

1.7
2. J.J

0 .1

21.7
10.4

Sad
Weak

1.3
2.6

16.5
15.0
10.5
9.8

o.o

9 .1
14.2

Passive

9.1
1 • J.J

12.3
4.0

6.6

16.4

.06

12.4

3.2

Ashamed

Non-Mood Items

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE:

J!.

= 22

• p

Nonalcoholic

M
-4.6
0.1
32.J.J
12.8

14 .1

Alcoholic

SD

M

SD

15.4

12.9

5.8
51.6

·11. 7
·27 .2

25.4
22.6
40.0

25.9

·9.8

37.2

for all group means •

< .05.

1.3
2.0

P Level

l Level

*
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Table B-4

Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Item

Group

Positives

Alert
Happy
Strong
Active
Proud
Cheerful
Friendly
Sociable
Clear
Relaxed
Neithers
Alert/Drowsy
Happy/Sad
Irritable/Cheerful
Strong/Weak
Angry/Friendly
Active/Passive
Lonely/ Sociable
Proud/Ashamed
Confused/Clear
Tense/Relaxed

Nonalcoholic
M

SD

13.0
18.0
17 .8
14.7
15.3
16.9
19.9
20.8
15.7
15.2

9.7
13.5
18.31
15.5
13.5
13.6
14.6
17.5
18.3
11.8

Nonalcoholic

6.0
18.8
14.6
17.6
17.7
10.6
16.7
18.2
15.5
17.3

7.6
13.9
9.9
16.0
12.8
9.2
14 .1
19.2
15.5
17 .3

Alcoholic
M

16.4
14.9
15.2
16.4
13.8
14.0
13 .8 .
16 .1
13.5
14.4

SD

16 .1
10.7
10 .1
11.0
11.2
12.0
11.8
12. 7
10 .1
9.8

Alcoholic

15.4
14.8
13.4
12.3
10 .1
10 .6
16.4
16.8
7.9
8.3

P Level

21.2
12.8
11.0
12.2
11.3
12.8
16.7
12.0
9.8
10.7

l Level
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Table B-4 -Continuen.

Absolute Difference Scores by Item and by Group

Item

Group
Nonalcoholic

Negatives

SD
4.2

M

Angry

5.5
11.0

Irritable
Lonely
Confused
Tense
Drowsy
Sad
Weak
Passive
Ashamed

7.6
8.0
12.0
11.0

Preoccu. Eating
Preoccu. Using
Confident-Resist.
Shared

NOTE: .!!.

= 22

7.5
10.6

9 .1
11 • 1
10.2
6.9
6.7
11.0

2.3

3.5

7.8

Non-Mood Items

9.2
11.9

Nonalcoholic
M

SD

7.9
2.9
40.2
20.6

13.9
5.0
45.5
19.9

for all group means.

* p < .05.

Alcoholic

M
13.0
13 .1
12.3
9.6
16.9
8.4
7.4
10.9
15 .1
9.4

SD
15 .1
15.0
7.6
10. 1
13.0
6 .1
5.5
8.7
8.7
7.7

Alcoholic

M
14.3
12.5
28.2
27.0

l Level

SD
24.5
22.2
39.4
26.8

P Level
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